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Proactive Complementarity: The International
Criminal Court and National Courts in the
Rome System of International Justice
William W. Burke-White*

When the International Criminal Court (“ICC” or “Court”) was established in 2002, states, nongovernmental organizations (“NGOs”), and the international community had extraordinarily high expectations that the Court would bring an end to impunity and provide broad-based accountability for
international crimes. Nearly five years later, those expectations remain largely unfulfilled due to political
constraints, resource limitations, and the limited ability of the ICC to apprehend suspects. This article
offers a novel solution to the misalignment between the Court’s limited resources and legal mandate on the
one hand and the lofty expectations for it on the other, arguing that the Court must engage more actively
with national governments and must encourage states to undertake their own prosecutions of international
crimes. It advocates a shift in the ICC’s role through a policy of “proactive complementarity,” whereby the
Court would encourage and at times assist states in undertaking domestic prosecutions of international
crimes. The article examines the legal mandate for such a policy, considers the political constraints on the
Court, offers a practical framework for the implementation of proactive complementarity in the range of
circumstances the ICC is likely to face, and documents examples of proactive complementarity in the ICC’s
initial operations. Overall, the article argues that encouraging national prosecutions within the “Rome
System of Justice” and shifting burdens back to national governments offer the best and perhaps the only
ways for the ICC to meet its mandate and help end impunity.

I.

INTRODUCTION

The establishment of the International Criminal Court in 2002 was accompanied by extraordinary optimism for the prospects of international
criminal justice. After the sixtieth state ratified the Rome Statute in April
2002, U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan announced that “[i]mpunity has
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Jurisdiction, Cooperation and Complementarity Division of the ICC, particularly Paul Seils, Rod Raston,
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to those who read or commented on earlier drafts of this work, including William Schabas, Colleen
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been dealt a decisive blow.”1 States, nongovernmental organizations, and the
global public all had high expectations for the new Court’s ability to provide
widespread accountability for international crimes.2 These high hopes
largely failed to reflect the reality of the ICC’s modest capabilities. Whereas
the preamble to the Rome Statute anticipates that the Court should help
“put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of . . . [international] crimes,”
the capacity of the Court and the limited resources made available to it
suggest that it will, at best, make a far more limited contribution to ending
impunity.
Neither the legal mandate of the ICC nor the resources available to it are
sufficient to allow the Court to fulfill the world’s high expectations. The
global community expects the ICC to provide worldwide accountability, yet
the Court’s own internal predictions and the current level of funding from
the Assembly of States Parties (“ASP” or “Assembly”) anticipate a maximum of two to three trials per year.3 In addition, the Court optimistically
assumes that states will cooperate in the arrest and surrender of indictees.
This combination of unrealistic hopes and limited capacity raises the real
prospect that the Court will be seen as a failure only a few years after its
creation. Any limited contribution it may make will inevitably fall short of
the global community’s high expectations.
As a potential solution to this misalignment of expectations, mandate,
and resources, the ICC could participate more directly in efforts to encourage national governments to prosecute international crimes themselves.
This solution, predicated upon the ICC’s ability to motivate and assist national judiciaries, could be termed “proactive complementarity.”4 Under
such a policy, the ICC would cooperate with national governments and use
political leverage to encourage states to undertake their own prosecutions of
international crimes. In order for the Court to meet expectations, national
governments must fulfill their obligations to provide accountability. The
1. Press Release, Office of the Secretary-General, Transcript of Press Conference with President Carlo
Ciampi of Italy and Secretary-General Kofi Annan in Rome and New York by Videoconference, U.N.
Doc. SG/SM/8194 (Apr. 11, 2002) (following ratification of the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court in Rome, Italy).
2. See infra Part II.A.
3. This prediction is based on the average trial length at similar international tribunals, such as the
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”), where many trials have taken a
year or more. While the ICC does have three simultaneously operating trial chambers, it presently has
only one courtroom available, limiting the potential sitting time of any particular chamber. See infra Part
II.D.
4. The term “positive complementarity” is used by some commentators to describe a similar policy
approach. Proactive complementarity, however, better reflects the nature of the policy and better highlights its distinction from the Court’s present approach that might be termed “passive complementarity.” See Payam Akhavan, The Lord’s Resistance Army Case: Uganda’s Submission of the First State Referral to
the International Criminal Court, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 403, 413 (2005) (referring to a positive interpretation
of complementarity). Various NGOs have also used the term “positive complementarity.” See, e.g., Christopher Keith Hall, Amnesty International, Statement at the Second Public Hearing of the Office of the
Prosecutor (Sept. 26, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/organs/otp/otp_public_hearing/otp_ph2/
otp_ph2_HGNGO_2.html.
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formal adoption of a policy of proactive complementarity would help the
ICC come far closer to meeting expectations with its limited resources.
Upon assuming office in 2003, the ICC’s Prosecutor, Luis MorenoOcampo, stated, “[a]s a consequence of complementarity, the number of
cases that reach the Court should not be a measure of its efficiency. On the
contrary, the absence of trials before this Court, as a consequence of the
regular functioning of national institutions, would be a major success.”5
Similarly, in an address to the diplomatic corps at The Hague in 2004, the
Prosecutor noted that a key strategic priority would be to take “a positive
approach to complementarity. Rather than competing with national systems
for jurisdiction, we will encourage national proceedings wherever possible.”6
The Prosecutor’s statements embody the concept of proactive complementarity, according to which the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) will, in the
right circumstances, encourage national governments to undertake their
own investigations and prosecutions of crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction.7
Despite these early statements, the Prosecutor appears to have moved
away from a policy of proactive complementarity, instead focusing the OTP
on the direct prosecution of international crimes.8 As the Prosecutor explained in a major policy address in June 2007, “I was given a clear judicial
mandate. My duty is to apply the law without political considerations. I will
present evidence to the Judges and they will decide on the merits of such
evidence.”9 The Prosecutor noted that he would neither attempt to adjust
his approach based on political considerations nor respond to or alter the
policies of national governments. He stated that
for each situation in which the ICC is exercising jurisdiction, we can
hear voices challenging judicial decisions, their timing, their timeliness, asking the Prosecution to use its discretionary powers to adjust to
the situations on the ground. . . . These proposals are not consistent
with the Rome Statute. They undermine the law States Parties committed to.”10
To date, the ICC has not, at least intentionally, engaged in a policy of
proactive complementarity. Nor has it strategically used the various tactics
5. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement Made at the Ceremony for the Solemn
Undertaking of the Chief Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court (June 16, 2003), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/030616_moreno_ocampo_english_final.pdf.
6. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement of the Prosecutor to the Diplomatic Corps
(Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LOM_20040212_En.pdf.
7. Christopher Keith Hall, The Powers and Role of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court in the
Global Fight Against Impunity, 17 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 121, 135–36 (2004).
8. See Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Building a Future on Peace and Justice, Address
at the International Conference in Nuremberg (June 24–25, 2007), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
library/organs/otp/speeches/LMO_nuremberg_20070625_English.pdf.
9. Id.
10. Id.
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developed in this article that could further such a policy. The Court’s failure
to use consciously its power to catalyze national prosecutions is a potentially
dangerous mistake. Although the Prosecutor is right to focus on the Court’s
legal mandate and to reject politically driven calls for amnesty, neglecting
the ICC’s political and legal power to encourage national prosecutions of
international crimes may well undermine the institution’s best hope to meet
expectations and enhance accountability. This article urges the OTP to implement a policy of proactive complementarity that utilizes the full range of
legal and political levers of influence available to the Court to encourage and
at times even assist national governments in prosecuting international
crimes themselves. By following such a policy, the Court will maximize its
impact despite its limited resources.
The concept of complementarity inherent in a policy of proactive complementarity differs considerably from the understandings of complementarity
articulated at the time of the drafting of the Rome Statute in 1998 and in
the Court’s practice to date. Compared to proactive complementarity, the
Court’s current practice and the understanding of the drafters might better
be termed “passive complementarity.” The complementarity provisions of
the Rome Statute, at least as understood in 1998, highlight the Court’s role
as a backstop to national jurisdictions.11 Passive complementarity suggests
that the ICC would step in to undertake its own prosecutions only where
national governments fail to prosecute and where the Court has jurisdiction.12 The ICC, it was thought, would simply substitute an international
forum for a domestic one. In contrast to passive complementarity, proactive
complementarity recognizes that the ICC can and should encourage, and
perhaps even assist, national governments to prosecute international crimes.
Proactive complementarity builds on the fact that the Rome Statute does
far more than merely define the limits of the Court’s power. The Statute
creates a system of judicial enforcement for the prosecution of the most serious international crimes at both the domestic and international levels of
governance. The Statute also affirms the duties and rights of both national
governments and the ICC to prosecute such crimes13 and reifies the obliga11. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 17, July 12, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 900
[hereinafter Rome Statute]; see also John Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity, in THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE—ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 41 (Roy Lee
ed., 1999) [hereinafter Holmes, The Principle of Complementarity]; John Holmes, Complementarity: National
Courts versus the ICC, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: A COMMENTARY 667 (Antonio Cassese et al. eds., 2002) [hereinafter Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus
the ICC] (“Ironically, however, the provisions of the Rome Statute itself contemplate an institution that
may never be employed.”).
12. See Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts versus the ICC, supra note 11, at 667 (“Of course, in
reality there is a need for the ICC, since States may be unwilling to exercise jurisdiction over international crimes.”).
13. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl. (“[I]t is the duty of every State to exercise its criminal
jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes” and “the most serious crimes of concern to
the international community as a whole must not go unpunished and . . . their effective prosecution must
be ensured by taking measures at the national level and by enhancing international cooperation.”).
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tions of states to assist the ICC in its own investigations and prosecutions.14
In so doing, the Rome Statute creates a tiered system of prosecutorial authority that could be characterized as the “Rome System of Justice.”15
Within this system, both the domestic and international levels of governance have interrelated international legal duties to provide accountability for
international crimes.
As a strategy for encouraging national governments to undertake their
own prosecutions of international crimes, proactive complementarity would
allow the Court to catalyze national judiciaries to fulfill their own obligations to prosecute international crimes. Those obligations are found in a
wide range of international treaties, including the Geneva Conventions of
1949 and the Genocide Convention, and such obligations are reaffirmed in
the preamble to the Rome Statute itself. Specifically, a strategy of proactive
complementarity would use the Court’s legal and political powers to activate
states’ domestic courts in international criminal prosecutions. The admissibility requirements of article 17 of the Rome Statute do not merely limit
the cases the ICC can hear; rather, they regulate the allocation of authority
between states and the ICC. Article 17 recognizes the shared competence,
and perhaps even common duty, of national and international institutions to
help bring about an end to impunity. In the Rome System, then, the ICC
and national governments are engaged in a broad set of interactions directed
toward accountability for international crimes.
Proactive complementarity derives its force from this broad perspective
on the Rome System of Justice since it utilizes the potential for the ICC to
encourage domestic prosecutions and contribute to the effective functioning
of national judiciaries. Such a policy could produce a virtuous circle in
which the Court stimulates the exercise of domestic jurisdiction through the
threat of international intervention. As a result, the Court would not have to
undertake prosecutions of at least some cases itself and could focus its energy
and resources on those cases in which there is no available domestic alternative, thereby maximizing its contribution to the statutory goal of ending
impunity.
For the ICC to meet its mandate and to fulfill expectations, the Prosecutor’s early rhetoric of encouraging domestic prosecutions must be transformed into a formal policy of proactive complementarity that would
structure the ICC’s interactions with national governments. Specifically, a
strategy of proactive complementarity would draw upon the fact that the
potential for intervention by the ICC, if backed by a strong track record of
14. See id. arts. 86–99.
15. See William W. Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice: The International Criminal Court as Part
of a System of Multilevel Global Governance in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 557–90
(2005) [hereinafter Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice]; see also William Burke-White, A System of
Multilevel Global Governance in the Enforcement of International Criminal Law (July 14, 2006) (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Cambridge University) (on file with author) [hereinafter Burke-White, Multilevel Global Governance].
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investigating and prosecuting the most serious crimes within the Court’s
jurisdiction, will often have a catalytic influence on national governments.
The possibility of international prosecution can create incentives that make
states more willing to investigate and prosecute international crimes themselves. Likewise, proactive complementarity recognizes that some outside assistance may allow states to undertake prosecutions when they lack the
means to do so alone. Finally, proactive complementarity can shift both expectations and the burden of action back to states—which, after all, have the
primary legal obligations to prosecute international crimes.16
Just as proactive complementarity offers a potentially effective and efficient means of allowing the ICC to fulfill its mandate, its implementation
raises new questions for the Court. These include the development of useable
tactics of political influence, the practical difficulties of coordinating with
national governments, and the legal dangers around compromising a case’s
subsequent admissibility before the ICC. The OTP must therefore develop a
cautious and carefully tailored strategy of proactive complementarity that
achieves its benefits and minimizes potential dangers.
This article argues that a policy of proactive complementarity and the full
activation of the Rome System of Justice offer the most effective, and perhaps the only, way for the ICC to meet its mandate and expectations. Particularly as the 2009 Review Conference approaches, if the Court is to avoid an
early and visible failure, the formal adoption of a policy of proactive complementarity is an urgent imperative.17 Asserting that proactive complementarity would go far to remedy the misalignment of expectations and resources
available to the ICC, this article develops the legal, political, and practical
frameworks for such a policy. Part II examines the misalignment of expectations, mandate, and resources. Part III suggests that proactive complementarity offers an effective means for maximizing the Court’s impact on ending
impunity. Part IV develops specific tactics for the implementation of proactive complementarity within the range of circumstances potentially faced by
the ICC. The article concludes by arguing that a cautious policy of proactive
complementarity has the potential to significantly enhance the success of the
overall objectives of the Rome System of Justice and to ensure the Court’s
long-term ability to meet expectations.
II. THE MISALIGNMENT

OF

EXPECTATIONS, MANDATE,

AND

RESOURCES

The entry into force of the Rome Statute of the ICC in July 2002 was the
culmination of more than a century of effort toward the establishment of a
16. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl. (“Recalling that it is the duty of every State to exercise its
criminal jurisdiction over those responsible for international crimes . . . .”).
17. Pursuant to article 123(1) of the Rome Statute, a Review Conference will be held seven years after
the Statute’s entry into force, at which amendments and changes to the Statute can be proposed and
considered. See id. art. 123(1).
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permanent international criminal tribunal. The creation of the Court was
widely viewed as a significant contribution toward ending impunity and
promoting the global rule of law. However, this optimism has not been
matched by the legal mandate given to the Court in the Statute or the
resources made available to it by the Assembly of States Parties. Moreover,
the creation of the ICC has given states an excuse to shift, at least rhetorically, the burdens of prosecuting international crimes from national governments to the new international tribunal. As a result of unrealistic
expectations and limited resources, the Court may well come to be seen as a
failure.
A. The Growth of Unrealistic Expectations
New institutions with global scopes often are accompanied by extraordinarily lofty expectations as a consequence of the concerted effort to generate
the necessary political support. The ICC is no exception. The Secretary-General’s 2004 Report on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in Conflict
and Post Conflict Societies observed that the ICC “offers new hope for a
permanent reduction in the phenomenon of impunity.”18 NGOs and civil
society movements in favor of the Court’s establishment championed its
cause and emphasized its transformative potential. Amnesty International
has argued that “[t]he establishment of a permanent International Criminal
Court will bring perpetrators to justice and provide redress to victims when
states are unable or unwilling to do so.”19 The executive director of Human
Rights Watch has described the rise of the ICC as a “turning point for
justice and the rule of law.”20 The convener of the Coalition for the International Criminal Court has likewise observed that the “Court is capable of
ending an era of impunity and is a symbol of the triumph of law over violence and brutality.”21 The same groups that raised hopes to facilitate the
creation of the court have continued to emphasize its potential even after the
Rome Statute’s entry into force in order to secure additional ratifications of
the Rome Statute and to generate ongoing support for the Court.22
18. The Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General on the Rule of Law and Transitional Justice in
Conflict and Post Conflict Societies, at 1, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc.
S/2004/616 (Aug. 23, 1994).
19. Amnesty International, International Criminal Court, http://www.amnestyusa.org/icc/index.do
(last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
20. Kenneth Roth, Executive Director, Human Rights Watch, Remarks to the International Criminal
Court Assembly of State [sic] Parties (Sept. 9, 2002), http://hrw.org/campaigns/icc/docs/ken-icc0909.
htm.
21. Press Release, Coalition for the International Criminal Court, International Criminal Court Established at Landmark U.N. Treaty Event (Apr. 11, 2002), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
04.11.2002ICCEstablished.pdf.
22. See William Pace, Convener of the Coalition for the ICC, Statement on the Occasion of the Entry
into Force of the Rome Statute (July 1, 2002), available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
BillPacePrepCom1July02.pdf (noting the Court’s potential and the need to secure additional ratifications
of the Rome Statute).
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The governments that have ratified the Rome Statute similarly look to
the ICC to perform a myriad of tasks, many of which go well beyond the
capacity and capability of the institution.23 For example, the Prime Minister
of Liechtenstein has noted that the Court has “a strong potential to help
prevent conflicts.”24 Canadian Foreign Minister Lloyd Axworthy has stressed
the ICC’s deterrent effect: “We need a new form of deterrence [against
atrocities]. The establishment of an International Criminal Court . . . which
makes impunity illegal and which holds individuals directly accountable for
their actions, is that deterrent.”25 Other states have suggested that the Court
will expand human rights protections. The former president of Argentina
has noted an expectation that the “institution will contribute to enhance the
rule of law and the respect for human rights.”26 The president of Croatia has
argued that the ICC will help ensure “universal protection” of human
rights.27 Finally, some states have boldly suggested that the ICC may promote international peace and security. The Czech Republic has gone so far as
to claim that the Court may transform the international system by “projecting the principle of justice into international relations.”28 Such hopes, realistic or unrealistic, have come to dominate global public debate.
Admittedly, many of these statements are rhetorical, and even the Court’s
proponents recognize its limitations. In particular, they acknowledge its
constrained jurisdiction and its lack of enforcement mechanisms.29 The
Prosecutor himself has observed that “[t]he Court can contribute to galvanize international efforts, and support coalitions of those willing to proceed
with such arrests. But ultimately, the decision to uphold the law will be the
23. Even when these expectations accurately portray the Court’s goals, it is highly unlikely that the
expectations will be achieved. See Recent Declarations: Statement of H.E. Mr. Mario Frick, Prime Minister of
the Principality of Liechtenstein, ICC UPDATE (Coalition for the Int’l Criminal Ct., New York, N.Y.), Sept.
21, 2000, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/iccupdate13.pdf (noting that “[t]he ICC will
lead to full accountability for the commission of the most serious crimes under international law”).
24. Id.
25. Recent Declarations: Statement of H.E. Lloyd Axworthy, ICC UPDATE (Coalition for the Int’l Criminal
Ct., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 18, 2000, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/iccupdate14.pdf.
The former Bulgarian foreign minister also has suggested that the ICC “[is] an efficient step . . . towards
deterring the possible perpetrators from committing such acts.” Recent Declarations: Statement of H.E.
Nadezhda Mihailova, ICC UPDATE (Coalition for the Int’l Criminal Ct., New York, N.Y.), Oct. 18, 2000,
available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/iccupdate14.pdf.
26. Recent Declarations: Statement of H.E. President Fernando de la Rúa, ICC UPDATE (Coalition for the
Int’l Criminal Ct., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 21, 2000, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/
iccupdate13.pdf.
27. Recent Declarations: Statement of H.E. President Stipe, ICC UPDATE (Coalition for the Int’l Criminal
Ct., New York, N.Y.), Sept. 21, 2000, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/iccupdate13.pdf.
28. Statements to the United Nations, Czech Republic, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT MONITOR,
Nov. 2000, at 11, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/monitor16.200011.english.pdf. Italy
has likewise expressed the view that the ICC will result in a “more democratic international system.” See
Statements to the United Nations, Italy, THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT MONITOR, Nov. 2000, at
11, available at http://www.iccnow.org/documents/monitor16.200011.english.pdf.
29. See Questions and Answers: The Office of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Coalition for the Int’l Criminal Ct. (Sept. 29, 2003), http://www.iccnow.org/documents/FS-Prosecutor.
pdf.
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decision of States Parties.”30 As might be expected, those with a more ambivalent view of the Court have also commented on its limitations.31 Nevertheless, the extraordinarily high hopes—even if, in part, rhetorical—into
which the ICC was born have fueled popular conceptions (or misconceptions) as to its judicial power and transformative potential. Even Joseph
Kony, the leader of the Lord’s Resistance Army now under ICC indictment,
is rumored to believe that the Court may be able to swoop down on his
hideout in Garamba National Park in the eastern Democratic Republic of
Congo (“D.R. Congo”) with Blackhawk helicopters to arrest him.32
Simultaneously, the Court’s detractors have sought to undermine its support by creating the perception of a powerful and invasive institution that
threatens national sovereignty. Former U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger has denounced the ICC’s power to “assert jurisdiction over Americans
even in the absence of U.S. accession to the treaty.”33 Another American
critic has warned that the ICC would “transfer the ultimate authority to
judge the policies adopted and implemented by the elected officials of the
United States, the core attribute of sovereignty . . . away from the American
people and to the ICC’s Prosecutor and judicial bench.”34 The American
Servicemembers’ Protection Act (“ASPA”) of 2002—which bars foreign assistance to states that support the ICC unless the country has signed a bilateral immunity agreement and authorizes the President to use “all means
necessary and appropriate” to “rescue” Americans in ICC custody—is designed to respond to what critics have portrayed as an extraordinarily powerful institution.35
The ICC emerged on the global stage in 2002, when the treaty entered
into force, with supporters and opponents alike expecting (or fearing) an
extremely strong and transformative institution. The Court, many claimed,
would offer an easy solution to long-term challenges ranging from impunity
to deterrence, from human rights protection to redress for victims. These
hopes may have been understandable and perhaps even necessary to the
Court’s creation; however, they are difficult, if not impossible, to satisfy.

30. Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 8.
31. See generally Ruth Wedgwood, The International Criminal Court: An American View, 10 EUR. J. INT’L
L. 93 (1999).
32. Interview with Fabius Okomo, in Gulu, Uganda (Aug. 27, 2006).
33. Henry Kissinger, The Pitfalls of Universal Jurisdiction: Risking Judicial Tyranny, FOREIGN AFF.
(July–Aug. 2001), at 86, 94.
34. Lee A. Casey, Assessment of the United States Position: The Case Against the International Criminal
Court, 25 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 840, 844 (2002).
35. The American Servicemembers’ Protection Act was signed into law by President George W. Bush
through the Supplemental Defense Appropriations Act of 2002. American Servicemembers’ Protection
Act of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107-206, §§ 2001–15, 116 Stat. 820, 899–909 (codified at 22 U.S.C.S.
§§ 7421–33 (2007)).
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B. The Dangers of Burden Shifting

The emergence of the ICC has had an unexpected and potentially dangerous effect on the pursuit of accountability as some states have sought to shift
the burdens of prosecuting international crimes from their own courts to the
new international tribunal. This burden shifting may take two forms. First,
the states in whose territory international crimes occur may decline to investigate and prosecute international crimes themselves, allowing the ICC to
carry the financial and political costs of prosecution. Second, other states
may limit the political pressure they apply to territorial states to prosecute
international crimes or may decline to exercise universal jurisdiction over
international crimes, again citing the ICC as an alternative to national prosecutions. Both of these scenarios involve shifting the legal and moral burden
of investigation and prosecution away from national governments and toward the ICC, making it all the more difficult for the Court to achieve the
more narrow mandate set forth in the Rome Statute.
In the first burden-shifting scenario, the potential for external intervention by the ICC provides the territorial state in which the crimes occurred a
kind of political cover for its own failure to investigate or prosecute. This
scenario presents a classic free-rider problem or “moral hazard,” in which
the existence of the ICC allows the territorial state to neglect its own legal
duties by pursuing a sub-optimal policy of judicial inaction and transferring
the costs of such prosecution to the ICC.36 The ICC investigation in Uganda
demonstrates a clear example of this free-rider problem. In January 2004,
the Ugandan government, led by President Yoweri Museveni, self-referred
crimes committed in northern Uganda—particularly those committed by
the Lord’s Resistance Army (“LRA”)—to the ICC pursuant to article 14 of
the Rome Statute, claiming that his government was unable to apprehend
suspects who had taken refuge in Congo and Sudan.37 In this case, the hidden moral hazard arises from the fact that, in all likelihood, the Ugandan
government is itself capable of bringing key members of the LRA to justice
through the use of domestic institutions and by cooperating with Congolese
authorities to allow the Ugandan military to apprehend suspects in Congo.38
However, domestic prosecutions would be financially and politically costly
36. For a more detailed discussion of this moral hazard effect, see Burke-White, Multilevel Global
Governance, supra note 15, at 217–24.
37. Press Release, ICC, President of Uganda Refers Situation Concerning the Lord’s Resistance Army
(LRA) to the ICC (Jan. 29, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/16.html. Apparently, the Ugandan President began to consider this move in December 2003 and subsequently met with
the ICC Prosecutor in London before making the formal referral. See Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan
Government Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity Principle: An Assessment of the First State’s Party
Referral to the ICC, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 83, 84 (2005).
38. The Ugandan People’s Defense Force (UPDF) is among the strongest armies in East Africa and
could arguably apprehend the fewer than 3000 LRA soldiers who remain at large. The strength of the
Ugandan military is demonstrated by its successful conduct of a war in the neighboring D.R. Congo,
where Kony is still hiding, from 1998 to 2003. See John F. Clark, Museveni’s Adventure in the Congo War:
Uganda’s Vietnam?, in THE AFRICAN STAKES OF THE CONGO WAR 145–61 (describing Ugandan interven-
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to the Museveni government.39 By referring the case to the ICC, Museveni
has been able both to garner international commendation and to respond to
domestic critics without having to face the costs of domestic prosecution. In
short, he has shifted the costs to the ICC, heightened expectations that the
Court will contribute to the Ugandan peace process, and raised the stakes for
the Court’s success.40
The second burden-shifting scenario involves a decreased willingness of
states to exercise universal jurisdiction to prosecute crimes that have occurred outside of their jurisdiction as a consequence of the ICC’s existence as
an alternative prosecutorial forum. In the wake of the war in the Balkans and
the genocide in Rwanda, a number of European states exercised universal
jurisdiction to prosecute perpetrators of crimes committed in those conflicts.41 In the future, such states may fail to exercise universal jurisdiction
themselves precisely because the ICC, to which they now make regular
budgetary contributions, exists and can itself prosecute. This scenario would
again shift costs to, and increase expectations of, the Court.42
It may be argued that while the alternative strategy of proactive complementarity may prevent states from shifting burdens onto the ICC, the strategy itself causes national governments to bear a disproportionate share of the
costs of prosecuting international crimes. This financial equity concern has
been particularly acute with respect to the referral-back mechanisms at the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”),
whereby the ICTY sends cases back to national judiciaries in order to meet
the goals of its own completion strategy but does not provide financing to
tions in the Congo). In addition, Uganda has a regular and well-functioning judiciary that could be used
to undertake prosecutions.
39. These political costs are exacerbated by the fact that the government is currently involved in a
delicate peace negotiation with the LRA, and evidence suggests that many victims might prefer an
amnesty process and reconciliation through traditional domestic mechanisms to ICC prosecutions if it
could help broker peace. Marc Lacey, Victims of Uganda Atrocities Choose a Path of Forgiveness, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 18, 2005, at A1. Lacey observes that “a number of those who have been hacked by the rebels, who
have seen their children carried off by them or who have endured years of suffering in their midst say
traditional justice must be the linchpin in ending the war.”
40. See Interview with Fabius Okumu, in Gulu, Uganda (Aug. 27, 2006) (noting the dangers of the
ICC’s involvement in northern Uganda). For broader discussion of the possible implications of selfreferrals to the ICC, see generally Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of ‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2
J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 949, 952 (2004); Matthew Happold, The International Criminal Court and the Lord’s
Resistance Army, 8 MELB. J. INT’L L. 159, 165–69 (2007) (analyzing the impact of the self-referral).
41. See, e.g., Military Prosecutor v. Gabrez, Tribunal militaire de division 1 [Military tribunal of
division 1] Lausanne, Apr. 18, 1997, unpublished; discussed in Andreas R. Ziegler, In re G., 92 AM. J.
INT’L L. 78, 78–82 (1998). But see In re Javor, Cass. crim. [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, criminal chambers], Mar. 26, 1996, Bull. crim., No. 132, at 379 (Fr.); In re Munyeshyaka, Cass. crim. [highest court of ordinary jurisdiction, criminal chambers], Jan. 6, 1998, Bull. crim., No. 2, at 3 (Fr.); Samiha
Abbas Hijazi v. Sharon, Cour d’appel [intermediate court of appeals] Brussels, June 6, 2002 (Belg.).
42. After the war in the Balkans, the Netherlands formed a special investigation unit for war crimes
committed in the former Yugoslavia that identified as many as eighty-five Dutch residents who could be
prosecuted. See LUC REYDAMS, UNIVERSAL JURISDICTION: INTERNATIONAL AND MUNICIPAL LEGAL PERSPECTIVES 171–72 (2003). This unit has subsequently been closed. Whether the Dutch government
might create an equivalent organization to address perpetrators of crimes within the ICC’s jurisdiction in
the future or instead rely on the ICC to conduct such prosecutions itself remains an open question.
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national jurisdictions for such prosecutions.43 While more active national
prosecutions of international crimes may well require domestic governments
to expend greater resources, this does not present a cost-shifting problem
because national governments already have a duty to prosecute such crimes.
Hence, a strategy of proactive complementarity does not actually impose
additional costs on them, but rather merely encourages them to fulfill their
extant international legal duties. In contrast, where the ICC takes up a case
in place of a national government, it essentially relieves the government of
the costs it would otherwise have to bear.
C. The Reality of a Limited Mandate
Born of compromise, the ICC is limited in many ways that its champions
sought to avoid.44 In particular, American fears of an overly strong Court
resulted in the creation of a far weaker tribunal than the optimistic statements quoted above would suggest.45 These limitations are clearly articulated in the Rome Statute’s jurisdiction and admissibility requirements.
Pursuant to article 12, the ICC can only assert jurisdiction where a crime is
committed on the territory of a state party or by a national of a state party.46
Though referrals from the Security Council, acting under Chapter 7 of the
U.N. Charter, may occasionally broaden the Court’s jurisdiction, the jurisdiction of the Court is extremely narrowly tailored, leaving out, for example,
jurisdiction based on the victim’s nationality or on the state in which an
accused is located.47 As a result, the ICC has no power to investigate or
prosecute many international crimes that would otherwise meet the gravity
threshold for ICC prosecution.
The admissibility requirements of the Rome Statute further limit the legal mandate of the Court and restrict its ability to meet the expectations of
its supporters. According to the Statute, the “International Criminal Court
established under this Statute shall be complementary to national criminal
jurisdictions.”48 As a consequence of this requirement, the ICC can only
43. For a discussion of the transfer procedure, see generally Daryl A. Mundis, The Judicial Effects of the
“Completion Strategies” on the Ad Hoc International Criminal Tribunals, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 142, 146 (2005);
Larry D. Johnson, Closing an International Criminal Tribunal While Maintaining International Human Rights
Standards and Excluding Impunity, 99 AM. J. INT’L L. 158, 168–74 (2005). José E. Alvarez has also noted
this problem with respect to the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), which he argued
diverted resources that could be better spent on national prosecutions. See generally José E. Alvarez, Crimes
of States/Crimes of Hate: Lessons from Rwanda, 24 YALE J. INT’L L. 365, 400, 414–15, 461–62 (1999).
44. See, e.g., Laurence Weschler, Exceptional Cases in Rome: The United States and the Struggle for an ICC,
in THE UNITED STATES AND THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 85 (Sarah B. Sewall & Carl Kaysen
eds., 2000) (describing the compromises pushed by the United States during the Rome Conference).
45. Id. (describing the compromises that resulted in a weaker Court).
46. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 12.
47. See id. art. 13 (“The Court may exercise its jurisdiction with respect to a crime referred to in
article 5 in accordance with the provisions of this Statute if . . . [a] situation in which one or more of such
crimes appears to have been committed is referred to the Prosecutor by the Security Council acting under
Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations.”).
48. Id. pmbl.
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investigate or prosecute where national governments fail to act or where
they undertake investigations or prosecutions that are not genuine.49 Unlike
prior ad hoc tribunals such as the ICTY, the ICC does not have the power to
remove cases from national courts or to prosecute where national governments are already investigating a case.50
Perhaps the Court’s greatest legal limitation is that it lacks any means to
ensure the arrest and surrender of suspects. Although states parties face a
legal obligation to arrest indictees within their jurisdictions, their willingness and ability to do so is often questionable.51 The continued liberty of
Joseph Kony and the rest of the indicted leadership of the Lord’s Resistance
Army, who sought refuge from Uganda in the D.R. Congo, highlights the
ICC’s inability to ensure that indictees are brought to trial in a timely fashion.52 Likewise, the recent appointment of ICC indictee Ahmad Mohammed
Harun to the post of Sudanese Minister of State for Humanitarian Affairs
demonstrates the difficulties the Court faces in getting states to surrender
suspects to it.53 In fact, one of the only two individuals arrested to date was
already in Congolese custody at the time his arrest warrant was served on the
government of the D.R. Congo.54 Without a direct means to arrest indictees
and in the face of limited state cooperation in apprehending suspects, the
prospect that the ICC courtroom in The Hague will sit largely empty for the
foreseeable future is all too real.

49. Id. art. 17.
50. Compare Statute of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia art. 9, May 25,
1993, 32 I.L.M. 1192, with Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17. The best example of the ICTY assuming jurisdiction from national courts is the early case of Dus̆ko Tadic, who was being prosecuted by
Germany at the time the ICTY decided to exercise jurisdictional primacy. See Prosecutor v. Tadic, Case
No. IT-94-1-D, Decision of the Trial Chamber on the Application by the Prosecutor for a Formal Request for Deferral (Nov. 8, 1994).
51. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 86, 89 (providing a general obligation of cooperation and
imposing an obligation to arrest).
52. See Prosecutor v. Kony, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Warrant of Arrest for Joseph Kony Issued on
8 July 2005 as Amended on 27 September 2005 (Sept. 27, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/
library/cases/ICC-02-04-01-05-53_English.pdf. Despite the fact that D.R. Congo and Uganda both face
affirmative legal obligations to arrest Kony, neither state has taken action to do so, even though the
location of Kony’s hideout in Garamba Park, eastern D.R. Congo, is widely known. See Press Release,
U.N. Mission in DR Congo, Garamba, Kony’s New Hide-Out (June 9, 2006), available at http://www.
monuc.org/news.Aspx?newsID=11306. This failure to arrest may be due to capacity constraints on both
governments, the implications that such an arrest might have for the ongoing peace process in Uganda,
and/or the simple unwillingness of the two states to meet their obligations under the Rome Statute. The
arrest warrant for Kony and the LRA leadership has subsequently been circulated through Interpol. See
Interpol, Arrest Warrant Issued by ICC, http://www.interpol.int/Public/Wanted/Search/SearchWanted
By.asp?WANTEDBY=ICC (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
53. For a discussion of the challenges of apprehending Harun, see Press Release, ICC, Prosecutor
Briefs U.N. Security Council, Calls for the Arrest of Ahmed Harun and Ali Kushayb for Crimes in
Darfur (June 7, 2007), http://www.icc-cpi.int/pressrelease_details&id=251.html.
54. See Marlise Simmons, Congo Warlord Handed to International Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2006, at
A10.
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D. The Reality of Limited Resources

Beyond limited legal powers, the Court and each of its organs—the OTP,
the Chambers, and the Registry—have limited budgets that are set annually
by the ASP.55 The approved budget for the ICC fiscal year 2005 was only
=66,784,200.56 This allocation represented less than a quarter of the annual
C
operating budget of the ICTY, despite the ICC’s far broader jurisdiction.57
Moreover, this =
C66.8 million allocation fell short of the Court’s request to
the ASP and required the ICC to scale back certain programs and staffing.58
These budget limitations provide an absolute ceiling on the activities that
can be undertaken by each of the Court’s key units and restrict the strategies
=66.8
that the ICC can pursue to meet its goals. No institution with a C
million annual budget can possibly provide global accountability.
The limited resources provided by the ASP mean that, at present, the
OTP is only able to undertake three simultaneous investigations, and it is
unlikely that its capacity will expand in any meaningful way in the near
future.59 Going forward, the OTP “aims at conducting 4–6 investigations
between June 2006 and the end of 2009.”60 Even such an expanded number
of investigations can in no way live up to the expectations of NGOs, states
parties, and the global community.
The Court’s Chambers also face similar resource constraints. At present, it
is anticipated that the Chambers will be able to undertake at most two trials
per year, with a target of between four and six trials over the next three-year
55. While thus far the Assembly has been relatively generous in its funding of the Court, there are
reasons to believe that the Assembly will not support the continued enlargement of the Court and that
serious budget limitations may arise in the immediate future. See, e.g., ICC, Report of the Committee on
Budget and Finance on the Work of Its Sixth Session, ICC-ASP/05/01 (May 4, 2006), available at http://www.
icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-1_English.pdf. For information on currently available finances, see
ICC, Financial Statements for the Period 1 January–31 December 2005, ICC-ASP/05/02 (Aug. 8, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/asp/ICC-ASP-5-2_English.pdf. Admittedly, national prosecutors’ offices may also face budget constraints that dictate which cases may be tried. However, whereas the
ICC’s budget is out of the Court’s direct control and rests with the ASP, national governments generally
have greater flexibility in the allocation of resources among domestic institutions.
56. Jonathan O’Donohue, The 2005 Budget of the International Criminal Court: Contingency, Insufficient
Funding in Key Areas and the Recurring Question of the Independence of the Prosecutor, 18 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
591, 593 (2005). Even the Court’s budgetary request was tempered by the political realities of ASP
funding. States were unwilling to provide additional funding and sought to limit the growth of the
Court. See generally id.
57. The 2005 operating budget of the ICTY was approximately $329 million, equivalent to =
C273
million at then-prevailing exchange rates. See The Secretary-General, Report of the International Tribunal for
the Prosecution of Persons Responsible for Serious Violations of International Humanitarian Law Committed in the
Territory of the Former Yugoslavia Since 1991, at 5, U.N. Doc. A/60/267-S/2005/532 (Aug. 17, 2005).
58. O’Donohue, supra note 56, at 595.
59. At the time of writing, four investigations are simultaneously underway in D.R. Congo, Uganda,
Central African Republic, and Sudan.
60. Michel de Smedt, OTP, Statement at the Second Public Hearing of the Office of the Prosecutor
(Sept. 25, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_PH2_HGSTATES.pdf.
These predictions are also used in the Court’s budget as set by the ASP. See O’Donohue, supra note 56, at
593.
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period.61 Given the budgeting policies of the ASP, it seems most unlikely
that there will be any considerable capacity increase in the number of trials
the Court can undertake per year in the foreseeable future.62 As a result, the
actual number of cases that can be heard by the ICC in any given period will
remain low, particularly in comparison to the vast number of international
crimes committed under the ICC’s jurisdiction each year.
Three investigations and, at most, two trials per year cannot end impunity or even make a statistically significant contribution toward accountability. Though the prosecution of a few high-level offenders can have
considerable legal and moral impact, it cannot achieve the broader goals of
the Rome System, much less meet the unrealistic demands that have been
put on the Court. Given this context of inflated expectations, burden-shifting from states to the ICC, and severe resource limitations, there is a significant risk that the ICC will soon come to be viewed as a failing institution.
The forthcoming 2009 Review Conference of the Rome Statute will provide
a critical opportunity for an assessment of the ICC’s impact to date. If present trends continue, it seems highly unlikely that the ICC will be deemed
to have met expectations when this reflection process begins in earnest.
To avoid either a real or perceived failure, new strategies must be developed to end impunity and to contribute to at least some of the broader
expectations of the Court. Such strategies must fit within the ICC’s legal,
political, and financial limitations and must help shift the burden of prosecution back to states. By effectively harnessing national jurisdictions in the
pursuit of accountability, the policy of proactive complementarity advocated
here has the potential to make a considerable contribution toward ending
impunity without the need for a substantial expansion of the Court’s resources and capacity. Likewise, such an approach would help further the
Court’s other goals, such as national reconciliation and judicial reconstruction. Critically, a policy of proactive complementarity would shift burdens
back to states to meet their duty “to exercise . . . criminal jurisdiction over
those responsible for international crimes.”63 In so doing, the policy would
moderate expectations on the Court by emphasizing that it is the primary
duty of national governments—not the ICC—to provide accountability and
to end impunity.
III. MAXIMIZING

THE IMPACT OF THE ICC THROUGH A POLICY
PROACTIVE COMPLEMENTARITY

OF

A policy of proactive complementarity offers the potential to transform
the Court’s statutory limitations into advantages that would allow it to
61. De Smedt, supra note 60, at 16.
62. For somewhat skeptical views of the ASP providing additional funding, see O’Donohue, supra
note 56, at 593–96.
63. Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
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maximize its impact on impunity. Such a policy confers upon the ICC a dual
function: first, the Court encourages national governments to undertake
prosecutions of international crimes themselves; second, it directly prosecutes such crimes where national governments remain unable or unwilling
to do so. By heretofore focusing almost exclusively on the second of these
two potential roles, the ICC has not made the most of the resources and
mandate available to it. By instead balancing the functions of promoting
domestic prosecutions with direct prosecution by the Court, the ICC can
significantly enhance its overall impact.
Applied in practice, this policy would use the legal and political influence
of the ICC to catalyze domestic investigations and prosecutions of international crimes. By threatening international prosecution, for example, the
Court would alter the incentives facing national governments to try such
crimes themselves. Such an approach would be properly employed where
there is reason to believe that, with proper encouragement and assistance
from the ICC, states may become willing or able to undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions. Additionally, it would be appropriate where
the active encouragement of national proceedings offers a resource-effective
means of ending impunity without compromising the direct investigations
and prosecutions the ICC may decide to undertake. Such a formal policy of
proactive complementarity would give substance to the idea inherent in the
Rome System of Justice that states and the Court share responsibility for the
prosecution of international crimes and should complement, and even influence, one another in achieving their common goal of ending impunity. To
this end, it would be appropriate for the OTP to formalize a policy of proactive complementarity.
A. The Logic of Proactive Complementarity
Recognizing that national courts are often the most effective and efficient
institutions at providing accountability, a policy of proactive complementarity seeks to promote the exercise of domestic jurisdiction over international
crimes.64 As the Prosecutor’s September 2003 Policy Paper concluded,
“[n]ational investigations and prosecutions, where they can properly be undertaken, will normally be the most effective and efficient means of bringing
offenders to justice; States themselves will normally have the best access to
evidence and witnesses.”65 National courts also are generally the most costeffective entities to undertake prosecutions, as their cost structures are often
lower than those of international tribunals by virtue of employing local
64. For a discussion of the processes whereby international criminal law has been nationalized to allow
for domestic prosecutions, see Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Nationalizing International Criminal Law, 41 STAN.
J. INT’L L. 1 (2005).
65. ICC, OTP, Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, at 2 (Sept. 2003),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/otp/otp_policy.html [hereinafter Paper on Some Policy Issues before
the Office of the Prosecutor].
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rather than foreign personnel. They can also operate exclusively in the local
language rather than translating all materials into the official U.N. languages.66 Finally, national prosecutions are often better situated to respect
the interests of affected communities and have a greater potential to contribute to restorative justice efforts.67 Broader activation of national courts in
the effort to end impunity can capitalize on these comparative advantages.
Proactive complementarity offers a powerful means of achieving these goals.
The establishment of the ICC in 2002 radically changed the incentives
facing states with respect to the prosecution of international crimes in two
different ways. First, as noted above, national states may act as free riders
and fail to prosecute crimes because the ICC now provides an alternative
forum to which they can shift the costs of prosecution. Second, however, the
threat of international prosecution by the ICC also generates a countervailing, positive set of incentives for national governments to pursue prosecutions themselves. ICC prosecution not only shifts a financial burden from
states to the international community, but its intervention into otherwise
exclusively domestic criminal processes imposes considerable sovereignty
costs on national governments that states may seek to avoid by undertaking
their own investigations and prosecutions.68
Involvement by the ICC also imposes a wide range of non-financial costs
on states that fail to undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions. In
particular, through a prosecution by the ICC, states will lose prosecutorial
freedoms like the ability to determine specific charges, witnesses to be
called, and evidence to be presented.69 Additionally, the internationalization
of a prosecution may result in greater (and largely negative) publicity for the
state and restrict its ability to control or manipulate publicity surrounding a
trial. Likewise, international prosecutions may impose reputation costs on
66. See William W. Burke-White, Regionalization of International Criminal Law Enforcement: A Preliminary Exploration, 38 TEX. INT’L L. J. 729, 738–41 (2003).
67. Specifically, the proximity of national courts to impacted communities facilitates greater involvement in, and awareness of, judicial proceedings for victims. Similarly, the use of domestic law and
national judges helps make judicial proceedings more understandable for impacted communities. See Neil
Kritz, Progress and Humility: The Ongoing Search for Post-Conflict Justice, in POST-CONFLICT JUSTICE (M.
Cheriff Bassiouni ed., 2002). For a discussion of restorative justice, see Elizabeth Kiss, Moral Ambition
Within and Beyond Political Constraints: Reflections on Restorative Justice, in TRUTH V. JUSTICE 68, 79–83
(Robert I. Rotberg & Dennis Thompson eds., 2000). On the importance of the proximity of trials for
restorative justice efforts, see Burke-White, supra note 66, at 734–38.
68. Here “sovereignty costs” refer to what Kenneth Abbott calls “the symbolic and material costs of
diminished national autonomy.” Kenneth W. Abbott, Symposium on Method in International Law: International Relations Theory, International Law, and the Regime Governing Atrocities in Internal Conflicts, 93 AM. J.
INT’L L. 361, 375 (1999).
69. For example, territorial states have no control over actual prosecutions before the ICC. Charges are
determined by the Prosecutor and confirmed by the Pre-Trial Chamber. Decisions to keep certain information under seal are at the discretion of the Chamber, and publicity is handled through the Court’s
Public Information Division. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 53–58. To get a sense of the ICC’s
present and, perhaps, inadequate media and publicity efforts, the ICC website provides a catalog of press
releases, which are indicative of the relatively limited outreach efforts to date, http://www.icc-cpi.int/
press/pressreleases.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
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national governments, both with respect to other states and domestic audiences, by indicating that they have failed to meet their legal obligation to
prosecute crimes domestically.70 Given these sovereignty costs imposed by
international prosecutions, many states may be willing to accept the political and financial costs of domestic prosecution in order to avoid international intervention. Where the sovereignty costs of international
intervention outweigh the political and financial costs of domestic prosecution, the threat of ICC intervention may encourage domestic judicial systems to prosecute international crimes themselves.
One consequence of generating both positive and negative incentives is
that the Court must essentially perform a balancing act in its relations with
national governments. It must seek to minimize its free-rider effect and
maximize its catalytic impact. To achieve this goal, the Court should strive
to reduce the financial and political costs that national governments bear
when they prosecute crimes domestically by assuming some of those political costs itself. Likewise, the Court should attempt to increase the sovereignty costs associated with international intervention where national
governments fail to prosecute. It can do so first by making the prospect of
international prosecution appear inevitable should national courts fail to
prosecute and, second, by stressing the costs an international prosecution
would impose on national governments. By appearing to force the hand of
national governments to prosecute international crimes, the ICC may be
able to assume some of the political costs associated with domestic prosecutions and thereby make it easier for the national government to act.
Whether the threat of international intervention will create free-rider
states or instead prompt national judicial action will depend, to a large degree, on how national governments calculate the comparative costs of domestic and international prosecution. National governments that perceive
the financial and political costs of domestic prosecution to be quite high,
and the sovereignty cost of international intervention to be quite low, are
likely to become free riders. On the other hand, national governments that
perceive the costs of domestic prosecution to be relatively low, and the sovereignty costs of international intervention to be relatively high, are more
likely to utilize national prosecutions.
The goal of a policy of proactive complementarity must be to create incentives for states to maximize the catalytic effect of the Court and minimize
the free-rider problem. Essentially, the Court must structure its relationship
with each government in ways that seek to reduce the perceived costs of
domestic prosecution and increase the perceived sovereignty costs of international intervention. The key to a policy of proactive complementarity lies in
recognizing that the Court—and the OTP in particular—has the potential
70. For a discussion of the role of reputation, see JONATHAN MERCER, REPUTATION
POLITICS (1996).
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to impact and shape the incentives facing national governments to meet
their obligations to prosecute international crimes within the Rome
System.71
The ICC and the OTP have a number of tools they can use to promote
national investigations, including leverage and persuasion. The ability to use
leverage arises principally from the basic legal relationship enshrined in the
Rome Statute, which confers upon the ICC the authority to intervene when
national governments fail to undertake investigations or when their efforts
at prosecution are less than genuine. For national governments that would
prefer domestic investigation and prosecution to international action, the
mere existence of the ICC may do much to encourage genuine national proceedings. Where the use of such leverage is not possible, more active efforts
by the OTP could range from diplomatic communications with governments to the provision of assistance in undertaking prosecutions.
The current ICC investigation in Sudan provides a clear example of how
the threat of international prosecution can induce domestic authorities to
prosecute international crimes themselves. In March 2005, the U.N. Security Council referred the situation in Sudan to the ICC.72 Immediately after
the Prosecutor’s June 6, 2005 announcement that he would begin an investigation,73 the Sudanese government objected to ICC prosecution of Sudanese nationals and announced that it would establish special domestic
tribunals to prosecute approximately 160 individuals suspected of international crimes in Darfur.74 On June 14, 2005, the Sudanese government established the Darfur Special Court, and, in November of the same year, it
created two additional courts: a Judicial Investigations Committee and a
Special Prosecutions Committee.75 The Sudanese Minister of Justice, Ali
Mohamed Osman Yassin, publicly asserted that the Sudanese domestic
courts would be a “substitute to the International Criminal Court.”76 Given
the timing of the creation of the new Sudanese domestic courts and the
government’s rhetoric, the new institutions appear to be a direct response to

71. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl., art. 4.
72. S.C. Res. 1593, ¶ 1, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1593 (Mar. 31, 2005). For a discussion of the situation in
Sudan, see International Crisis Group, Darfur: The Failure to Protect, at 1 (Mar. 8, 2005). On resolution
1593, see Robert Cryer, Sudan, Resolution 1593, and International Criminal Justice, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L.
195 (2006).
73. See Press Release, ICC, The Prosecutor of the ICC Opens Investigation in Darfur (June 6, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/press/pressreleases/107.html.
74. SUDAN: Darfur War-Crime Suspects Won’t Go to ICC, Government Says, IRINnews.org, Apr. 4,
2005, http://www.irinnews.org/print.asp?ReportID=46436.
75. See ICC, OTP, Third Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court to the U.N. Security
Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (June 14, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/
cases/OTP_ReportUNSC_3-Darfur_English.pdf [hereinafter Third Report].
76. SUDAN: National Courts to Try Suspects of War Crimes, IRINnews.org, June 15, 2005, http://www.
irinnews.org/report.asp?ReportID=47654.
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the ICC’s investigation in an effort to block the admissibility of cases pursuant to article 12 through a domestic prosecution.77
Although Jan Pronk, U.N. special representative of the Secretary-General
for Sudan, described the new Sudanese court as “positive,” there is real concern as to whether it will undertake genuine prosecutions or merely act as a
legal shield to ICC activities.78 In the wake of the establishment of these
new domestic institutions, the OTP has undertaken a careful admissibility
analysis in Sudan. To date, reports suggest that while a number of domestic
investigations have been opened, few have been concluded.79 The Darfur
Special Court has “conducted six trials of less than thirty suspects,” with
charges limited to armed robbery, possession of stolen goods, and illegal
possession of a firearm.80 Based on its analysis of the work of these domestic
institutions, the OTP has determined that domestic Sudanese institutions
do not prejudice the admissibility of cases before the ICC because they have
“not investigat[ed] or prosecut[ed] . . . cases that are or will be the focus of
ICC attention.”81 Despite questions as to whether the Sudanese efforts to
prosecute are genuine, the situation clearly demonstrates that states will respond to altered incentives created by the threat of ICC investigation, ideally by utilizing their own courts to prosecute international crimes
genuinely.
Significantly, the Sudanese case also illustrates that employing a policy of
proactive complementarity would in no way limit the statutory authority of
the ICC to investigate and to prosecute where the Court has jurisdiction and
where national governments fail to undertake genuine prosecutions themselves. Though proactive complementarity seeks to stimulate national jurisdictions, there may be circumstances in which domestic courts cannot be
motivated to act and the ICC will find it more effective to undertake its own
prosecutions. In addition, where domestic proceedings that result from a
policy of proactive complementarity are less than genuine, the ICC retains
the power to intervene, pursuant to article 17 of the Rome Statute.
In addition to altering the incentives facing national governments
through the threat of international prosecution, the ICC can also change the
domestic calculation of whether to undertake national prosecutions by
utilizing the diplomatic and publicity channels available to the Court. The
ICC can also use publicity and outreach to increase the reputation costs for
states that fail to undertake genuine prosecutions on their own. Statements
to the U.N. Security Council and the Assembly of States Parties or to NGOs
that condemn states for failing to prosecute international crimes can signifi77. See Sudan Reiterates Opposition to Try Darfur Suspects Before ICC, SUDAN TRIB., Oct. 18, 2005, http://
www.globalpolicy.org/intljustice/icc/2005/1018opposition.htm.
78. Id.
79. See Third Report, supra note 75, at 5.
80. Id.
81. Id. at 7.
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cantly increase the reputation costs those states face for their policies of inaction. Demands for the ICC to provide widespread accountability may be
legitimate but nonetheless fall outside of the Court’s current capabilities.
Integral to a policy of proactive complementarity must be an effort to
temper expectations and shift the burden of providing accountability back
to the national governments. In its public statements, the OTP must make
clear what it is capable of doing itself (the investigation and prosecution of a
very limited number of crimes), what may follow from its activities (greater
domestic accountability and deterrence), and what lies beyond the scope of
its powers (national reconciliation, rule of law, and international peace and
security). Through publicity and outreach, the OTP must channel such demands toward their most appropriate recipients, in most cases the state with
primary jurisdiction over the offenses in question. Reminding governments
and the global public that national governments, and not the ICC, have the
primary duty to prosecute will be particularly important. In circumstances
in which the OTP cannot act because of limited resources or an inability to
obtain evidence or arrest an accused, the OTP may want to consider deflecting demands for accountability toward the Assembly of States Parties as part
of a broader call for additional resources or support from states parties in
apprehending suspects.
B. Implications of a Policy of Proactive Complementarity
A policy of proactive complementarity has the potential to significantly
enhance the effectiveness of the OTP and may help it meet at least some of
the high expectations of its various constituents. The most immediate implication of a policy of proactive complementarity is to increase the number
of available judicial fora through which to prosecute international crimes.
To the degree that the OTP is able to encourage states to prosecute international crimes themselves, a greater contribution can be made toward ending
impunity beyond those few cases that the Court itself can prosecute. Moreover, proactive complementarity can help guide the OTP in selecting the
situations in which it can have the greatest impact.82 Where there is reason
to believe that a state can be encouraged to prosecute crimes on its own, the
Prosecutor may not need to formally open an investigation and commit significant resources to a case. Instead, by using the threat of investigation and
demonstrating that his Office is actively considering prosecutions, the Prosecutor may be able to catalyze the domestic prosecution without a large
investment of resources. As a result of greater national accountability, the
ICC can focus its resources where they matter most: situations in which
serious international crimes have occurred and there is no available national
82. The OTP uses a number of criteria to select situations and cases for investigation and prosecution.
See ICC, OTP, Draft Policy Paper on Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases (June 13, 2006) (on file
with author).
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forum able and willing to undertake a genuine prosecution or that could be
encouraged to do so through the Court’s use of proactive complementarity.
Proactive complementarity would also make a significant contribution toward meeting many of the other goals of the Court, including deterring
crime, closing the impunity gap, promoting reconciliation, and developing
effective exit strategies. First, a policy of proactive complementarity would
enhance the ICC’s ability to deter crimes.83 Although there is no empirically
verifiable evidence to date demonstrating that the Court has been able to
reduce the occurrence of crimes, deterrence theory suggests that an increase
in the perceived likelihood of punishment should decrease the commission
of international crimes.84 Some extant qualitative research studies suggest,
for example, that certain ICC indictees were concerned about the prospect of
ICC prosecution years before their indictment or arrest.85 Paramilitaries have
reportedly cited the Court’s potential prosecution as part of their reasoning
for relinquishing power.86
Second, a policy of proactive complementarity offers an effective means of
closing the impunity gap. An impunity gap arises where an international
forum prosecutes only those most responsible for international crimes, leaving lesser offenders a degree of impunity.87 Proactive complementarity can
help close this gap by encouraging domestic prosecutions of international
crimes, including those that may not meet the gravity threshold for prosecution by the ICC. In addressing such an impunity gap, proactive complementarity may provide a space within which the OTP can recognize and respect
the diverse ways in which states provide accountability for international
crimes. Although the Rome Statute specifies that the ICC will undertake
criminal investigations and prosecutions of the most serious crimes within
the Court’s jurisdiction, states may choose to pursue other forms of accountability, especially for lower-level offenders, including truth commissions,
reparations programs, lustration policies, or traditional justice mechanisms.88 A policy of proactive complementarity would allow the OTP to
83. For domestic legal analogies, see JOHANNES ANDENæS, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE (1974)
(providing a traditional account of the logic of criminal deterrence); DETERRENCE AND INCAPACITATION:
ESTIMATING THE EFFECTS OF CRIMINAL SANCTIONS ON CRIME RATES (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., 1978)
(examining how punishments impact criminal behavior). For an application to the work of the ICTY, see
Payam Akhavan, Beyond Impunity: Can International Criminal Justice Deter Future Atrocities?, 95 AM. J.
INT’L L. 7, 12 (2001) (“[T]he threat of punishment may persuade potential perpetrators to adjust their
behavior.”). For broader application in international criminal law, see Jan Klabbers, Just Revenge? The
Deterrence Argument in International Criminal Law, 12 FINNISH Y.B. INT’L L. 249, 251–53 (2001).
84. For application of deterrence theory to international criminal law, see Klabbers, supra note 83, at
251–53.
85. See Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice, supra note 15, at 587–89.
86. Habla Vicente Castaño, SEMANA (COLOM.), June 6, 2005, at 29, available at http://www.
semana.com/wf_InfoArticulo.aspx?idArt=87628.
87. For a discussion of the impunity gap, see Carla Del Ponte, Prosecutor of the ICTY, Address to the
Permanent Council of the OSCE (Sept. 7, 2006), http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2006/p1106e-CDP
speech.htm. See also Paper on Some Policy Issues before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 65.
88. For a discussion of these choices and the various mechanisms available to states to provide some
form of accountability, see PRISCILLA HAYNER, UNSPEAKABLE TRUTHS: CONFRONTING STATE TERROR
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decide when to pressure national governments to undertake criminal prosecutions of their own with the possibility of an ICC investigation acting as a
coercive alternative. Without having to endorse states’ choices with respect
to non-criminal sanctions,89 the OTP could decide in some situations not to
initiate investigations or pressure states to prosecute, particularly where it
appears that national efforts at accountability, even if based on non-criminal
sanctions, have adequately served the goals of ending impunity.90 As a result, proactive complementarity could help the Court regulate a “margin of
appreciation” afforded to national governments in determining which accountability mechanisms are most appropriate within their particular
context.91
Third, in certain situations proactive complementarity may offer a viable
exit strategy for the OTP and help the OTP leave a lasting legacy when it
concludes its work in each situation. Given the potentially global mandate
of the Court and its limited resources, it will often not be possible for it to
prosecute all or even a majority of those most responsible for international
crimes within any particular situation. At some point, as a result of resource
allocation, global events, national prosecutions, and impact to date, the OTP
will need to move on to a new situation.92 The ideal exit strategy for the
Court would be the establishment of an effectively functioning national judiciary to pick up where the ICC leaves off.93 If the ICC is able to encourage
ATROCITY (2001) (recounting the work of various truth commissions); MARTHA MINOW, BETWEEN
VENGEANCE AND FORGIVENESS: FACING HISTORY AFTER GENOCIDE AND MASS VIOLENCE (1998) (exploring alternative justice mechanisms); RUTI TEITEL, TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2002) (examining mechanisms
of justice); Carsten Stahn, The Geometry of Transitional Justice: Choices in Institutional Design, 18 LEIDEN J.
INT’L L. 425 (2005) (considering institutional design choices in implementing international criminal law
enforcement mechanisms).
89. From a legal perspective, the OTP’s adoption of a strategy of proactive complementarity should
not have adverse consequences for its legal authority to prosecute international crimes. The ongoing
threat of prosecution by the ICC may, however, influence the choices of national governments with
respect to the nature of domestic accountability efforts they undertake, i.e., whether to pursue criminal
prosecutions, non-criminal sanctions, truth commission proceedings, or something else.
90. Though the use of non-criminal sanctions, such as truth commissions, can be criticized for failing
to provide punishment, national governments may, at times, choose to pursue these routes for a variety of
reasons. As the ICC is focused only on providing accountability for those most responsible for international crimes, it can leave choices as to proper accountability mechanisms for lower-level offenders to
national governments. See ICC, OTP, Draft Policy Paper on the Selection of Cases (June 2006) (on file
with author) (referring to the gravity threshold for ICC investigation). Moreover, depending on the
design and requirements of a truth commission, it may still allow for some degree of accountability or at
least condition amnesty on a truth-telling process. Other types of non-criminal accountability could
include the payment of compensation to victims or ineligibility for certain governmental positions.
91. The term “margin of appreciation” is drawn from the European Court of Human Rights jurisprudence and refers to the space given to national governments to implement human rights obligations. See
Handyside v. United Kingdom, App. No. 5493/72, 24 Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1976). For an extension of
the margin of appreciation doctrine to other areas of international law, see Yuval Shany, Toward a General
Margin of Appreciation Doctrine in International Law?, 16 EUR. J. INT’L L. 907 (2005).
92. For a discussion of the plans of the OTP over the next three years, see De Smedt, supra note 60.
93. Obviously, this will not be possible in every situation, and resource allocation must be carefully
considered before engaging in significant domestic capacity-building. However, to the extent a functioning national judiciary can be established, it would represent an ideal exit strategy for the Court.
AND
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national prosecutions through proactive complementarity, such that domestic courts are actively providing justice, the ICC may be able to exit a situation precisely because its continued intervention is no longer necessary.94
As a whole, a policy of proactive complementarity can make an important
contribution to ending impunity by utilizing all available judicial resources,
not just national courts or international institutions, in a common quest for
accountability. It would encourage states to meet their international legal
duties to prosecute international crimes and would go far toward reaching
the high expectations that the ICC could not otherwise meet.
C. The Legal Mandate for a Policy of Proactive Complementarity
For the ICC to embrace a policy of proactive complementarity that encourages national prosecutions of international crimes, such a policy must
have a legal basis in the Rome Statute or in the inherent powers of the
Prosecutor. The passive model of complementarity appears to offer little
support for a policy of proactive complementarity. Interpreting complementarity to operate in its passive form, one views article 17 of the Rome Statute
as circumscribing the powers of the OTP, and thus limiting the admissibility of cases to situations where national governments are “unwilling or unable” to prosecute.95 In contrast, an understanding of complementarity
derived from the Rome System of Justice, in which national courts and the
ICC share a common responsibility to prosecute international crimes, sees
the admissibility criteria of article 17 as empowering domestic courts and
the ICC to cooperate in ensuring accountability. From this perspective, the
Statute provides both implicit and explicit legal support for a policy of
proactive complementarity.
Despite the fact that the active encouragement of national prosecutions
may not have been envisioned by the drafters of the Rome Statute, a careful
analysis of article 17 makes clear that nothing in the article prohibits the
OTP from pursuing a policy of proactive complementarity. According to
article 17, cases must be deemed inadmissible before the ICC if they are
being or have been investigated or prosecuted by national authorities, unless
such national investigation or prosecution is not genuine.96 As a result,
94. To the extent that the threat of prosecution by the OTP is a necessary pressure point to encourage
national governments to prosecute such crimes themselves, the ICC’s exit from a situation may offer such
governments a disincentive for further prosecution. For proactive complementarity to offer a meaningful
exit strategy for the ICC, the momentum of domestic prosecutions will have to be sufficient for their
continuation even in the absence of immediate threat of further action by the Court. Of course, the ICC
could always decide to reopen a particular situation for further investigation, though that appears an
unlikely scenario. It is also possible that the initiation of domestic prosecutions could serve a socialization
or acculturation function that alters incentives in favor of further domestic action even after the ICC
exits. For a discussion of such acculturation, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, How to Influence States:
Socialization and International Human Rights Law, 54 DUKE L.J. 621 (2004).
95. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
96. Article 17 provides that a case shall be inadmissible where the case is being or has been “investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over it, unless the State is unwilling or unable
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states have the primary right and duty to prosecute international crimes and
the Court steps in where they fail, for whatever reason, to do so. The Statute
calls upon the Prosecutor to evaluate the ability and willingness of a national
government to investigate or to prosecute crimes within the Court’s jurisdiction. Specifically, in his decision to initiate an investigation or prosecution, the Prosecutor must, under article 53, consider whether “[t]he case is
or would be admissible under article 17.”97 Even after the initiation of an
investigation, the Statute further requires the Prosecutor to evaluate national
judicial efforts and to inform the Pre-Trial Chamber if there are no grounds
for prosecution because a genuine national proceeding has made the case
inadmissible.98 Article 17, however, in no way limits the OTP from attempting to encourage national prosecutions, even if the result of such effort
would be to render cases inadmissible before the ICC.
The principle of complementarity has different legal implications at two
separate phases of investigation by the OTP. The first phase, the situational
phase, arises when the Prosecutor makes an initial decision to investigate a
particular situation. The second phase, the case phase, arises subsequently,
when the Prosecutor identifies a particular suspect and develops an investigative hypothesis as to the crimes that the suspect may have committed.99
At both of these stages, the Prosecutor must scrupulously consider actions
by states that might bar admissibility.
At the situational phase, complementarity requires the OTP to undertake
a general examination of whether the cases the Prosecutor might decide to
undertake are already being investigated or prosecuted by national authorities.100 Where efforts by states to investigate or to prosecute within a given
situation are sufficient and genuine, the complementarity analysis at this
phase would suggest that investigation by the OTP is inappropriate. In congenuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.” Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17. On the
principle of complementarity, see generally Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts Versus the ICC, supra
note 11, at 66; Mohamed El Zeidy, The Principle of Complementarity: A New Machinery to Implement International Criminal Law, 23 MICH. J. INT’L L. 869 (2002); and M. A. Newton, Comparative Complementarity:
Domestic Jurisdiction Consistent with the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, 167 MIL. L. REV. 20
(2001).
97. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1)(b).
98. Id. art. 53(2).
99. For the distinction between situations and cases, see Situation in the Democratic Republic of the
Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Decision on the Applications for Participation in the Proceedings of
VPRS1, VPRS2, VPRS3, VPRS4, VPRS5 and VPRS6, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006), public redacted version
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-101_tEnglish-Corr.pdf [hereinafter Situation
in the Democratic Republic of the Congo]. See also Silvia A. Fernández de Gurmendi, The Role of the
International Prosecutor, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME STATUTE—ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 175, 180–82 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999). On the same distinction, but
in the context of Security Council referrals, see Lionel Yee, The International Criminal Court and the Security
Council: Articles 13(b) and 16, in THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: THE MAKING OF THE ROME
STATUTE—ISSUES, NEGOTIATIONS, RESULTS 147–48 (Roy S. Lee ed., 1999).
100. Pursuant to article 53(1)(b), when seeking to initiate an investigation, the Prosecutor “shall
consider whether . . . the case is or would be admissible.” Such a preliminary admissibility determination
requires the Prosecutor to have reasonable grounds for believing that admissibility would not be barred
by reasons of complementarity. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1)(b).
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trast, where national proceedings have not been initiated, have been initiated only with respect to certain groups of suspects (such as lower-level
perpetrators), or where there is reason to believe national proceedings are less
than genuine, there would be a reasonable basis for the OTP to proceed with
an investigation.101
At the case level, which arises when the Prosecutor develops an investigative hypothesis with respect to particular suspects and factual events, complementarity requires a more specific and detailed analysis of any
prosecutions occurring at the national level involving that particular suspect. Article 17 requires that the Prosecutor determine whether the specific
case he intends to bring is being or has been investigated or prosecuted by
national authorities. To do so, the Prosecutor must determine whether national authorities have investigated or prosecuted the individual subject to
potential prosecution by the OTP for the same underlying factual events.102
Where no such investigation has been or is being undertaken, the case
would be admissible. If an investigation or prosecution has been or is being
undertaken by a state, a second step of analysis is required. In such circumstances, the Prosecutor must consider whether the national investigation is
genuine or not, based on the criteria set forth in article 17(2).103 If the national proceedings are not genuine or the state is unable to prosecute, then
the OTP may proceed with an investigation and prosecution of its own.
The Pre-Trial Chamber also has a role in making admissibility determinations. When a situation has been referred to the Court by another state or by
the Security Council, the Prosecutor must inform the Pre-Trial Chamber of
his decision not to proceed with an investigation due to admissibility limitations.104 Where the Prosecutor seeks to proceed with an investigation initiated under his proprio motu powers, the Pre-Trial Chamber must
affirmatively approve his decision and may take admissibility into account
in deciding whether to authorize the investigation.105 The Pre-Trial Chamber also has to make determinations of admissibility in its decisions to issue
101. This statement assumes that the other requirements of article 53(1) are met.
102. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 99, ¶ 65 (Jan. 17, 2006).
Although evaluating a domestic judiciary may be difficult, the benefit of the formulation adopted by the
Office of the Prosecutor is that the test is considerably narrower than the “unable or unwilling” examination found in article 17 of the Rome Statute and requires the Prosecutor to determine merely whether a
national investigation of the same individual based on the same factual basis has been initiated. See Rome
Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
103. The Prosecutor is required to determine whether the investigation or prosecution was undertaken for the purpose of shielding the accused from criminal liability, whether there was an unjustified
delay in the proceedings, whether the proceedings were not independent and impartial, or whether they
were being undertaken in a manner inconsistent with bringing the person concerned to justice. In this
second step of analysis, the Prosecutor may also consider whether the state is unable to prosecute pursuant to article 17(3) due, for example, to a “total or substantial collapse or unavailability of its national
judicial system.” Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(2)–(3).
104. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 53(1). Where the Prosecutor has initiated action based on
referral by a state or the Security Council, the referring party can request the Pre-Trial Chamber to
review the Prosecutor’s decision. Id. art. 53(3)(a).
105. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 15.
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arrest warrants and, when admissibility is challenged by either an accused or
a state party, before the opening of an actual trial.106 Direct efforts by the
OTP to encourage national prosecutions do not, however, interfere with the
authority of the Pre-Trial Chamber to make final determinations of admissibility. While domestic trials catalyzed through a policy of proactive complementarity could lead to admissibility challenges, the Pre-Trial Chamber
would retain its ultimate authority to evaluate the genuineness of those
proceedings.
The formal requirements of admissibility found in article 17 are indicative of a passive approach to complementarity, in which the ICC provides a
substitute for national jurisdictions when they fail to act. Critically, however, none of the formal requirements of article 17 nor other parts of the
Statute restrict the Prosecutor from seeking to encourage national prosecutions. Instead, they merely limit the power of the OTP to undertake investigation or prosecution where genuine national investigations or prosecutions
are underway or have taken place. Hence, there is no statutory bar to the
Prosecutor’s pursuing a policy of proactive complementarity and such an
approach would in no way interfere with the powers of the Pre-Trial
Chamber.
Complementarity is not only a formal legal requirement of admissibility
limiting the power of the OTP but also a broader principle that allocates
authority among concurrently empowered institutions with differing levels
of governance authority within the international justice system.107 This
broad reading of complementarity sees the Rome Statute not just as the
foundational instrument of the ICC but also as the basis of a Rome System
of Justice in which states have a clear duty to prosecute international crimes
within their jurisdictions. The provision in the preamble to the Rome Statute that nations have a duty “to exercise . . . criminal jurisdiction over those
responsible for international crimes” derives from the aut dedere aut judicare
(extradite or prosecute) requirement108 to which most states parties are already subject through external legal obligations contained in, for example,
the four Geneva Conventions of 1949 and the Genocide Convention.109
106. For Pre-Trial Chamber jurisprudence on the admissibility determination at the arrest warrant
stage and reference to further consideration of the issue at the trial phase, see Prosecutor v. Dyilo, Case
No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Concerning Pre-Trial Chamber I’s Decision of 10 February 2006 and the
Incorporation of Documents into the Record of the Case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Feb. 24,
2006), Annex I (“Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for a Warrant of Arrest, Article 58” (Feb. 10,
2006), formerly under seal), ¶¶ 17–18, available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-0106-8-US-Corr_English.pdf [hereinafter Prosecutor v. Dyilo].
107. See generally El Zeidy, supra note 96 (describing the historical origins of complementarity and the
development of the principle); William W. Burke-White, A Community of Courts: Toward a System of
International Criminal Law Enforcement, 24 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1, 91–95 (2003).
108. See M. CHERIF BASSIOUNI, AUT DEDERE AUT JUDICARE: THE DUTY TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (1995) (discussing the duties of states to prosecute international crimes
and providing the detailed legal foundations for such duties in international law).
109. See Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of the Wounded and Sick in
Armed Forces in the Field arts. 49–51, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3114, 75 U.N.T.S. 31 [hereinafter
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Though encouraging national jurisdictions to undertake prosecutions is
not affirmatively referenced in the Statute, it furthers the Rome System’s
overall purpose of ending impunity. Pursuant to the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties, the Rome Statute must be interpreted in light of its
object and purpose.110 The preamble to the Statute affirms that the purpose
of the Court is to “put an end to impunity for the perpetrators of [international] crimes . . . .”111 Likewise, the preamble recognizes that “it is the
duty of every State to exercise its criminal jurisdiction over those responsible
for international crimes . . . .”112 Although these provisions are preambular
in nature, they provide critical guidance to the object and purpose behind
the Statute itself.113 Interpreting the Rome Statute in light of this object
and purpose leads to a broad construction of the Prosecutor’s specific powers
and suggests that leeway should be given to the Prosecutor to utilize not
only his enumerated powers but also the stature and broader potential of his
Office to help bring about an end to impunity. Moreover, the fact that the
Statute established an independent Prosecutor reveals that, in order to fulfill
his duties, he may have to take actions consistent with the Statute but not
expressly stated in it.114 From this perspective, the ICC and the OTP should
not be restricted to a purely passive exercise of complementary prosecutions.
In the Rome System, then, the complementarity provisions of the Rome
Statute offer a mechanism for allocating authority between states and the
ICC and recognizing the shared competence and duty that national and international institutions have in the realm of international justice. Although
Geneva Convention I]; Geneva Convention for the Amelioration of the Condition of Wounded, Sick and
Shipwrecked Members of Armed Forces at Sea arts. 50–52, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3217, 75 U.N.T.S.
85 [hereinafter Geneva Convention II]; Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of
War arts. 129–31, Aug. 12, 1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135 [hereinafter Geneva Convention III];
Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War arts. 146–48, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3516, 75 U.N.T.S. 287 [hereinafter Geneva Convention IV]. The Grave Breaches provisions of each convention call upon states parties “to search for persons alleged to have committed, or to
have ordered to be committed, such grave breaches, and shall bring such persons, regardless of their
nationality, before its own courts. It may also, if it prefers, and in accordance with the provisions of its
own legislation, hand such persons over for trial to another High Contracting Party concerned, provided
such High Contracting Party has made out a prima facie case.” Geneva Convention III art. 129; see also
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 6, Dec. 9, 1948, 102 Stat.
3045, 78 U.N.T.S. 277 (establishing jurisdiction over the crime).
110. Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 31, entered into force Jan. 27, 1980, 1155 U.N.T.S.
331, 8 I.L.M. 679 [hereinafter Vienna Convention] (“A treaty shall be interpreted in good faith in
accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and in the
light of its object and purpose.”).
111. Rome Statute, supra note 11, pmbl.
112. Id.
113. See Vienna Convention, supra note 110, Jan. 27, 1980. For a discussion, see Quincy Wright, The
Interpretation of Multilateral Treaties, 23 AM. J. INT’L L. 96 (1929) (noting the use of the preamble as part
of logical interpretation).
114. The position of Secretary-General of the United Nations provides a useful point of comparison.
Though some of the Secretary’s powers are spelled out in the U.N. Charter, it is generally accepted that
he has additional authority, based on his position and office, that allows him to take actions necessary to
fulfill his mandate and mission. For the formal legal mandate of the Secretary-General, see U.N. Charter
arts. 97–100.
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it does not expressly refer to a policy of proactive complementarity, the
Rome Statute provides for a number of specific interactions between the
OTP and states parties that may directly serve the goals of proactive complementarity. For example, it creates opportunities for communication and dialogue between the Court and national governments that may be utilized as
mechanisms to encourage national prosecutions. Specifically, article 15 allows the Prosecutor to seek information from states with respect to communications he receives.115 Article 18 requires that, in certain circumstances,
the Prosecutor notify the state that would ordinarily exercise jurisdiction of
his intent to open an investigation. Should the Prosecutor defer to a state’s
investigation, he has the authority to request that the state “periodically
inform the Prosecutor of the progress of its investigations and any subsequent prosecutions.”116 Such communications, which have a clear statutory
basis, provide a legal foundation for many of the tactics central to proactive
complementarity.
Article 53 of the Rome Statute allows the Prosecutor to continue his evaluation of admissibility issues—potentially through ongoing dialogue with
national governments—throughout the investigative phase of proceedings.117 Such an ongoing evaluation of admissibility, as evidenced in the
OTP’s approach to Sudan,118 anticipates that some states that are initially
unable or unwilling to prosecute may become able and willing during the
course of the OTP’s investigation. It also implies that outside factors, including the Court’s own activities, might contribute to that new willingness
or capacity. To the degree that this evaluative process by the ICC has an
impact on the willingness or ability of a national government to undertake
genuine prosecutions, it would be a hallmark example of proactive complementarity with clear statutory authority.
Article 54 of the Statute specifies the Prosecutor’s powers with respect to
investigations. The Prosecutor is empowered, inter alia, to “[s]eek the cooperation of any State or intergovernmental organization or arrangement in
accordance with its respective competence and/or mandate” and to “enter
into such arrangements or agreements, not inconsistent with this Statute, as
may be necessary to facilitate the cooperation of a State, intergovernmental
organization or person.”119 Such cooperation arrangements and agreements
again provide affirmative legal support for the types of interaction between
the OTP and states that could be used strategically to encourage domestic
prosecutions by national judicial systems. In fact, the grant of authority in
115. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 15(2).
116. Id. art. 18(5).
117. Id. arts. 53(1)(b), (2)(b).
118. In Sudan, the OTP has continuously monitored the Sudanese government’s efforts to provide
accountability. This process has involved ongoing evaluation of trials in Sudan, multiple missions by
OTP officials to Sudan for evaluative purposes, and periodic reports to the U.N. Security Council on
issues of admissibility. See Third Report, supra note 75.
119. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 54(3)(c)–(d).
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article 54 is extraordinarily broad, allowing the Prosecutor to enter into any
kind of arrangements not in conflict with the Statute itself and to design
such arrangements in ways that encourage active prosecutions by national
judiciaries.
The Rome Statute also creates a range of obligations on states parties that,
taken collectively, may provide an additional legal foundation for a policy of
proactive complementarity. These obligations include duties to cooperate
with the Court’s investigations (article 86), to have appropriate procedures
under national law to facilitate such cooperation (article 88), to surrender
persons to the Court if legal requirements are met (articles 59 and 89), and
to undertake various other forms of judicial cooperation (article 93).120 These
provisions and the general principle of pacta sunt servanda121 create direct
legal obligations for states parties to cooperate with the Court and to enact
necessary domestic legislation.122 Such obligations presuppose interactions
between the OTP and states that, if used strategically, may encourage prosecution of international crimes by domestic courts. Hence, they offer a basis
for developing tactics of proactive complementarity around the interactions
they create between the OTP and states.
With respect to interactions between states and the OTP that have a statutory basis, the only distinction that may be drawn in the context of a policy
of proactive complementarity is that these interactions are being used strategically to encourage national prosecutions. That distinction is not legally
significant in the Rome Statute. In fact, such strategic use of interactions is
fully in keeping with the object and purpose of the Statute. Concerning
potential tactics of proactive complementarity that are not expressly envisioned by the Statute, the key questions are whether those actions somehow
violate the Statute and, if not, whether they legitimately further its object
and purpose. All of the tactics of proactive complementarity discussed
herein either are expressly mentioned in the Rome Statute or are consistent
with its object and purpose.
D. Proactive Complementarity is Aligned with the Mission of the
Office of the Prosecutor
A policy of proactive complementarity is directly aligned with the mission of the OTP and would help the Prosecutor achieve his key goals. The
benefit of proactive complementarity is that it can leverage the Court’s limited resources to fulfill the purposes of the Rome Statute and more fully
meet expectations through the activation of national judiciaries. However,
120. Id. arts. 59, 86, 88–89, 93.
121. See Vienna Convention, supra note 110, art. 26 (Pacta sunt servanda embodies the principle that
“[e]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).
122. See Julio Bacio Terracino, National Implementation of ICC Crimes: Impact on National Jurisdictions
and the ICC, 5 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 421 (2007) (discussing the processes by which states have adopted
national implementing legislation for the Rome Statute).
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given the mission of the OTP and the fixed resources of the Court, efforts at
proactive complementarity may detract resources from the direct investigations and prosecutions that the ICC can undertake. From a practical perspective, then, the pursuit of proactive complementarity must be balanced with
the direct investigation and prosecution of crimes so as to conform to the
mission of the OTP and maximize the Court’s overall impact.
The mission and functions of the Office of the Prosecutor are expressed in
a number of provisions of the Rome Statute and can be summarized as the
investigation and prosecution of those responsible for crimes under the jurisdiction of the Court, subject to the limitations of articles 12 (governing
jurisdiction) and 17 (governing admissibility). The Statute clearly specifies
the Prosecutor’s powers with respect to the investigation and prosecution of
crimes.123 The Statute thus makes clear that the investigation and prosecution of international crimes are to be the primary functions of the OTP;
other activities, such as proactive complementarity, are of a secondary—
though potentially significant—nature.
The legal mandate of the Office of the Prosecutor highlights its primary
function of investigating and prosecuting international crimes where national governments fail to act themselves. As a criminal prosecutor’s office,
the OTP is institutionally designed to engage in the direct investigation and
prosecution of criminal conduct within the Court’s jurisdiction. Any policy
of proactive complementarity must further, rather than detract from, this
primary mission. Although selective activities designed to encourage or enhance domestic judicial activities may further the mission of the OTP, the
OTP cannot eschew its central prosecutorial mission by becoming either a
political lobbying body or a national judicial reconstruction institution.
Hence, it must pursue a policy of proactive complementarity within this
limited framework.
Other restrictions placed on the Prosecutor indicate that there are limits
to the reach of a policy of proactive complementarity. For example, the
Rome Statute provides that the OTP is to focus on crimes “of sufficient
gravity to justify further action by the Court.”124 The preamble specifies
that the Court is intended “to put an end to impunity for the perpetrators”
of “the most serious crimes of concern to the international community.”125
Given these gravity limitations, the focus of any policy of proactive complementarity must be targeted at crimes that would otherwise fall within the
123. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 12 (jurisdiction), 13 (jurisdiction), 15 (powers of the
Prosecutor), 17 (admissibility), 53 (investigation), 54 (duties of the Prosecutor). These powers of the
Prosecutor are subject to supervision by the Pre-Trial Chamber to ensure that the Prosecutor does not
overstep his statutory powers. For a discussion of the role of the Pre-Trial Chamber and its supervisory
function, see Fabricio Guariglia & Kenneth Harris, Functions and Powers of the Pretrial Chamber, in COMMENTARY ON THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT: OBSERVERS’ NOTES, ARTICLE BY ARTICLE 743 (Otto Triffterer ed., 1999).
124. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(1)(d).
125. Id. pmbl.
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Court’s jurisdiction and not reach more broadly to general judicial reconstruction efforts. However, efforts by the OTP to catalyze national courts to
prosecute crimes that would otherwise fall within the ICC’s jurisdiction may
well have the downstream effect of encouraging national governments to
pursue lower-level suspects and promote judicial development more broadly.
The resource limitations on the OTP also must limit the breadth of a
policy of proactive complementarity. Activities aimed at encouraging prosecution by national jurisdictions consume resources. Though activities such
as communication with national governments may be of relatively low cost,
other activities like national judicial reconstruction efforts may be very resource-intensive. Given that it is unlikely that the ASP will provide considerable new resources for the Court to devote to proactive
complementarity,126 such a policy necessarily involves tradeoffs with the resources committed to direct investigations and prosecutions by the OTP.
A key benefit of proactive complementarity, however, is that, if well implemented, it is far less resource-intensive for the ICC than would be the
direct investigation and prosecution of international crimes. For example, an
actual investigation and prosecution by the ICC can require a large team of
field investigators and trial staff in The Hague. In contrast, proactive complementarity can be implemented through a shift in the Court’s understanding of its own functions and simple activities such as direct communications
with national governments undertaken by one or two primary staff members.127 The OTP must design a strategy whereby, without significantly diverting resources from the investigations and prosecutions it must conduct,
it can more effectively use certain resources available to it to catalyze domestic prosecutions and to relieve the Court of the need to expend even greater
resources in prosecuting those crimes itself. Moreover, redirecting too many
resources away from prosecutions would undercut the effectiveness of proactive complementarity, which itself depends on the credible threat of intervention by the ICC.128
A policy of proactive complementarity must therefore involve a careful
balancing of resource allocation to maximize the Court’s impact. The bulk of
the OTP’s resources and personnel must remain devoted to direct investigation and prosecution of international crimes both to comply with the OTP’s
core mission and to make a credible threat of international intervention.
Where it appears that the selective diversion of resources toward proactive
complementarity could result in genuine national prosecutions, the OTP
must weigh the potential benefits of such national prosecutions against the
126. For discussion on funding provided by the ASP, see generally O’Donohue, supra note 56, at
591–95 (discussing budgeting policies of the ASP).
127. Admittedly, if a policy of proactive complementarity is successful, states will have to invest the
resources to undertake investigations and prosecutions. Yet, as already noted, states have the primary
obligations to undertake such prosecutions.
128. For a discussion of the political logic of proactive complementarity, see supra Part III.A.
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costs of the particular tactics of proactive complementarity in question.
Often, communicating with and applying political pressure to such governments, providing limited assistance to national judiciaries, and mobilizing
external resource networks will represent cost-effective means of encouraging national prosecutions. Even if more resource-intensive efforts, such as
the provision of considerable direct assistance to national judiciaries, were to
enable domestic prosecutions, they would likely divert sufficient resources
away from the Court’s core mission to make them inadvisable.
Much of the work of a policy of proactive complementarity is likely to fall
within the auspices of the Jurisdiction, Cooperation, and Complementarity
Division (“JCCD”) of the OTP. This unit has already faced budgetary constraints imposed by the ASP.129 The OTP should request that the ASP provide specific post allocations within the JCCD for the purposes of proactive
complementarity. This would not only ease these resource constraints but
would also provide formal support for such a policy from the ASP. To the
extent that proactive complementarity must be implemented with existing
resources, the JCCD may be able to build elements of proactive complementarity into existing posts—for instance, as part of its work in admissibility
assessment, bilateral and multilateral diplomacy, situation monitoring, and
state cooperation.130 Again, proactive complementarity cannot subsume
these other functions, but it can become a secondary goal of the OTP’s interactions with states. In many circumstances, such as during the process of
assessing admissibility, the tactics of proactive complementarity can closely
synergize with the existing activities of the JCCD and provide a cost-effective means of achieving the goals of the Rome System of Justice.131
IV.

IMPLEMENTING

A

POLICY

OF

PROACTIVE COMPLEMENTARITY

A policy of proactive complementarity would help the ICC resolve the
misalignment of mandate, resources, and expectations; and it would facilitate a more effective contribution toward ending impunity. Such a policy
does, however, raise real concerns with respect to resource allocation, the
reactions of states, and its impact on national judicial systems. These concerns require the execution of careful strategic choices and cautious implementation. This section examines potential strategies and key tactics that
the OTP could utilize to implement proactive complementarity.
The simplest approach to proactive complementarity would involve making it clear to states that the OTP welcomes their involvement in the genu129. See O’Donohue, supra note 56, at 595–97.
130. For a discussion of the role of the Jurisdiction, Cooperation, and Complementarity Division, see
Luis Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 6.
131. Clearly, other tactics of proactive complementarity, such as the provision of direct assistance to
national governments, would involve separate resource outlays. Such tactics must be carefully weighed to
determine their potential benefit. Such tactics might also involve other units of the OTP, such as the
Prosecution Division, that could provide prosecutorial training to national judiciaries.
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ine prosecution of international crimes. By articulating a strategy of
proactive complementarity in public statements and diplomatic exchanges
with states, the OTP could help ensure that the ICC does not create a chilling effect on domestic prosecutions or result in free-rider states. Additionally, such statements and exchanges would explicitly remind states of their
duty to prosecute international crimes and would reiterate the admissibility
criteria of the Rome Statute. Clear declarations to this effect would help
states recognize their own interests in national investigations and
prosecutions.
A more robust version of proactive complementarity would involve creating incentives for states to undertake investigations and prosecutions of
crimes that fall within the overlapping jurisdiction of the ICC and national
courts. Often, the OTP’s most powerful tool to encourage national prosecution is the threat of its own investigation, as such an investigation would
likely impose significant sovereignty costs on the state affected. The OTP
could use a range of communication methods that are authorized by the
Rome Statute to remind domestic authorities of the potential for intervention by the ICC. The creation of strategic incentives for national prosecution
through such communications and political leverage may be particularly effective where national governments have the capacity, but lack the will, to
prosecute international crimes.
The strongest version of proactive complementarity would actively enhance the ability of states to undertake genuine investigations and prosecutions. Efforts aimed at enhancing the ability of states to prosecute
international crimes may help domestic regimes exercise jurisdiction over
the perpetrators of such crimes where they previously lacked the capacity to
do so. Such efforts, however, may be highly resource-intensive and their
ultimate success may be out of the direct control of the Court. Hence, in
seeking to enhance the capacity of national judiciaries, the Court must carefully consider whether any particular project would be an efficient use of the
OTP’s limited resources, whether the Court is well-suited to engage in the
particular capacity-building task, and whether the means chosen are the
most effective for seeking to help end impunity.
A wide range of strategies for implementing a policy of proactive complementarity is available to the OTP. The tactics likely to be effective in any
situation will depend upon context, especially the preferences and capabilities of particular national governments. Accordingly, differentiated strategies based on the specific circumstances of the state in question will be
necessary. Generally speaking, the OTP’s relationships with the states over
which it elects to exercise jurisdiction will fall into one of three distinct
classes: (1) the state is able but unwilling to prosecute, (2) the state is willing but unable to prosecute, or (3) the state is engaged in an active division
of labor with the OTP. The sections that follow consider the application of
proactive complementarity in each of these contexts.
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A. The State with Jurisdiction Is Unwilling to Prosecute International Crimes
The first class of relationships between the ICC and domestic governments arises where a state is unwilling to undertake its own prosecutions
despite the fact that it has the capacity to do so. Of course, where a state
with jurisdiction is unwilling to prosecute a particular case, the OTP’s goal
is to prevent impunity. Under the traditional vision of the ICC’s role and
the passive approach to complementarity, the ICC would likely pursue that
goal by undertaking its own prosecution of those most responsible for the
international crimes in question. In contrast, a policy of proactive complementarity suggests that the ICC should first attempt to motivate the state to
undertake its own investigations and prosecutions and then, only if these
efforts are unsuccessful, undertake its own investigation and prosecution.
The unwillingness of a state to exercise jurisdiction is often the result of a
political calculation by judicial or executive officials of a government, according to which inaction is politically preferable to the exercise of domestic
jurisdiction. For example, a state might determine that the political and
financial costs of prosecution are simply too great to justify action. In these
cases, the implementation of proactive complementarity would involve the
OTP’s altering the incentives facing the unwilling state so as to increase the
likelihood that the state finds it politically advantageous to initiate its own
prosecutions. The OTP can alter these incentives most efficiently through
the threat of international prosecution and its attendant sovereignty costs.
A number of readily available tactics may allow the OTP to communicate
the threat of international prosecution to states and to increase the extent to
which states perceive their own failure to prosecute as detrimental to their
sovereignty. First, the OTP will need to develop a strong track record of
international investigations and prosecutions. Often, the most potent means
available to the Court to motivate unwilling states to act is to threaten intervention should the states continue to abstain from undertaking their own
investigations and prosecutions. A strong track record of ICC interventions
makes those threats credible. By developing such a track record, the OTP
can signal that international prosecution is a meaningful possibility, and
this real possibility of international prosecution will likely make the alternative of domestic prosecutions far more palatable to states previously unwilling to act. Simultaneously, the OTP can make clear to states that real
sovereignty costs will follow from such international intervention. The effective threat of international prosecution should therefore alter the incentives
facing states regarding the activation of previously unwilling national judiciaries as an alternative or complement to international prosecution.
Second, the OTP will need to actively monitor for potential crimes within
its jurisdiction and alert states to crimes within their jurisdictions.132 By
132. The OTP already routinely monitors the commission of crimes within its jurisdiction and is
aided in this effort by a robust set of communications to the OTP from NGOs and individuals. See Rome
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drawing attention to crimes within a state’s jurisdiction that appear to be
going unpunished, the OTP can alert national authorities and judiciaries to
the possibility of international prosecution and thereby encourage the activation of domestic judicial institutions by national governments seeking to
avoid the sovereignty costs of international prosecution.133 Ongoing attention from, and interaction with, the Court increases the perceived likelihood
of eventual international prosecution and thus may alter the interest calculation of some states—or, at least, of the domestic judicial officials within
those states—in favor of domestic action.
Third, the OTP will need to engage in dialogue with states that are unwilling to investigate or prosecute crimes themselves. By using the modalities established in the Rome Statute to communicate with states that were
previously unwilling to prosecute, the OTP may be able to cajole those
states into prosecuting crimes domestically. Such communication may focus
states’ attention on their obligations to prosecute international crimes, may
provide a form of acculturation through which accountability becomes a
norm of state conduct,134 and may allow states to recognize their own interests in domestic prosecutions. The OTP may also consider increasing the
reputation costs of continued domestic inaction through diplomatic or political pressure on states unwilling to prosecute. To do so, the ICC may use
bilateral dialogues with third-party states, encourage pressure from NGOs,
and raise the continued unwillingness of a state to prosecute in multilateral
fora.135 In some cases, direct communication and dialogue between the OTP
and states may facilitate the activation of previously unwilling domestic jurisdictions, as it would put states on notice that the ICC is considering
initiating an investigation. Similarly, raising a state’s failure to prosecute in
public fora may pressure the state to act so as to avoid negative reputation
costs.
The possibility of such communication is explicitly provided for in the
Rome Statute. The Prosecutor’s assessment of a potential situation under
article 15, the initial determination of admissibility under article 17, the
process of informing states of a possible investigation under article 18(1),
the reports to the Prosecutor with respect to a deferred investigation under
Statute, supra note 11, art. 15. For an exemplary indication of communications to the OTP, see ICC,
OTP, Update on Communications Received by the Office of the Prosecutor of the ICC (Feb. 10, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_Update_on_Communications_10_February_
2006.pdf (noting that 1732 communications had been received to date).
133. Articles 15 and 18 of the Rome Statute and Rule 104 of the Court’s Rules of Procedure and
Evidence explicitly provide for such contact between the OTP and states. Rome Statute, supra note 11,
arts. 15, 18; ICC, R. EVID. & PROC. 104, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-A) (2002).
134. For a discussion of how interaction with international institutions can play such a socialization
role, see generally Goodman & Jinks, supra note 94.
135. For example, the Prosecutor has used his regular reports to the U.N. Security Council with
respect to the situation in Darfur to raise the profile of the case and highlight the Sudanese government’s
unwillingness to prosecute. See ICC, OTP, Fourth Report of the Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court,
Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, to the U.N. Security Council Pursuant to UNSCR 1593 (2005) (Dec. 14, 2006),
available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/OTP_ReportUNSC4-Darfur_English.pdf.

R

R
R

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI101.txt

2008 / Proactive Complementarity

unknown

Seq: 37

28-DEC-07

14:21

89

article 18(5), and the Prosecutor’s decision to initiate or terminate an investigation under articles 53(1) and 53(2) all foresee communication between
the OTP and states and the provision of information to the OTP with respect to investigations and prosecutions undertaken by national judiciaries.136 Utilizing such communications would be fully consistent with the
OTP’s powers under the Rome Statute, would put states on notice of the
potential for international prosecution, and could pressure them to exercise
domestic jurisdiction.
Dialogue between states and the OTP can also address the problems of
both inadvertent and willful blindness to international crimes. With respect
to inadvertent blindness, dialogue can draw states’ attention to international
crimes, of which they may be unaware, that are occurring within their jurisdictions. Informing a state of the OTP’s interest in crimes within its jurisdiction might force a state to confront the reality that such crimes are
occurring and spur it to undertake prosecutorial efforts. With respect to
willful blindness, a public dialogue with the state may impose significant
reputation costs and may ultimately result in the state acknowledging ongoing crimes and undertaking domestic investigation to avoid continued international condemnation.
The potential for dialogue with national governments to encourage domestic prosecutions is illustrated by the ICC’s influence on Colombia’s hesitancy to hold paramilitary groups accountable for their crimes. In an effort
to bring paramilitary groups out of the jungle, the Colombian government
offered very generous terms for paramilitaries willing to join the peace process.137 Specifically, Colombia’s Peace and Justice Law, passed in late June
2005, limited accountability for the perpetration of crimes within the jurisdiction of the ICC by allowing paramilitaries to confess and face relatively
light sentences.138 The confessions, investigations, and sentences were designed to cover any crimes an individual may have committed and did not
offer guarantees of transparency or judicial process. At the very least, the
scope of accountability that the law would provide was questionable. Nonetheless, the judicial process enabled by the law might have been deemed a
national investigation sufficient, under articles 17 and 20 of the Rome Statute, to limit the admissibility of those cases before the ICC.139 Even though
the ICC had not opened an investigation in Colombia, senior officials in the
136. Rome Statute, supra note 11, arts. 15, 17, 18(1), 18(5), 53(1), 53(2).
137. For a background discussion on the situation of paramilitary groups in Colombia, see HUMAN
RIGHTS WATCH, SMOKE AND MIRRORS: COLOMBIA’S DEMOBILIZATION OF PARAMILITARY GROUPS (Aug.
1, 2005), available at http://www.hrw.org/reports/2005/colombia0805/colombia0805.pdf.
138. Juan Forero, New Colombia Law Grants Concessions to Paramilitaries, N.Y. TIMES, June 23, 2005, at
A3. Crimes under the law are also deemed political offenses, providing a shield to extradition requests
from other states.
139. The law has been significantly criticized by foreign governments, including the United States,
which has exerted pressure for the law to be amended before it will provide additional foreign aid. See
Juan Forero, U.S. Threat Is a Blow to Colombia’s Easy Terms for Death Squads, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 2005, at
A5. For other criticism, see Press Release, Amnesty International, Colombia: Justice and Peace Law Will
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OTP, concerned by the lack of accountability for potential crimes within the
Court’s jurisdiction, addressed a letter to the Government of Colombia in
2005 alerting them to the nature of the crimes to which the law applied and
informing them of the Court’s potential interest in the situation.140 Subsequently, the Colombian Constitutional Court struck down the law, modifying it to remove certain amnesty provisions and to better address various
human rights concerns.141 Senior Colombian officials have attributed this
change, at least in part, to fear of ICC involvement.142 Through dialogue
with the Colombian government, the ICC was able to help preserve the
possibility of full accountability in domestic courts.
The potential for dialogue to catalyze domestic prosecutions is greatest
when the OTP pursues communication with a wide range of domestic officials. When the OTP communicates with national governments to encourage domestic prosecutions of international crimes, as it did in Colombia,
it must determine the appropriate national interlocutors with whom to interact. Such communications are a form of diplomatic exchange that, according to the Rome Statute, should be “transmitted through the diplomatic
channel” unless states specify otherwise.143 Generally, that provision dictates
that the OTP should address its communications to the executive authority
of the state in question, usually the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although
such use of diplomatic channels is required as the first means of communication between the OTP and a state, in many circumstances, especially where
the executive authorities of the state are resistant to national prosecutions,
the OTP may seek follow-up communication directly with judicial or
prosecutorial authorities. Without circumventing the statutory use of diplomatic channels, such follow-up communication may allow the OTP to encourage an independent national judiciary to open a prosecution itself,
despite informal executive preferences or policies to the contrary.144 LikeGuarantee Impunity for Human Rights Abusers (Apr. 26, 2005), available at http://news.amnesty.org/
index/ENGAMR230122005.
140. Interview with Paul Seils, Senior Legal Officer, International Criminal Court, in The Hague,
Netherlands (June 30, 2005).
141. For a discussion of the decision, see Press Release, Human Rights Watch, Court Fixes Flaws in
Demobilization Law: Constitutional Ruling Orders Paramilitaries to Confess (May 19, 2006), available at
http://hrw.org/english/docs/2006/05/19/colomb13430.htm.
142. See Habla Vicente Castaño, supra note 86.
143. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 87 (providing statutory authority for communication with
States Parties and specifying the use of “the diplomatic channel”); see also ICC, R. EVID. & PROC. 176,
177, ICC-ASP/1/3 (part II-A) (2002) (delineating the responsibilities for communications among the
organs of the court).
144. Given the statutory requirement that formal communications be addressed through diplomatic
channels, direct contact with judicial officials may either follow from a formal diplomatic request to the
executive authorities of the state in question or may constitute more informal, voluntary interactions
through, for example, the growing number of networks of judicial officials in which the OTP participates. See Jenia Iontcheva Turner, Transnational Networks and International Criminal Justice, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 985 (2007) (noting the growing role of transgovernmental networks in enforcing international
criminal law); see also ANNE-MARIE SLAUGHTER, A NEW WORLD ORDER (2004) (developing the theoretical model for governance through networks).
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wise, such direct contact may help encourage interest groups within a state
to pressure their own government to alter policies to favor prosecutions.145
In addition to implementing strategies that will allow the OTP to convey
more effectively a meaningful threat of intervention to unwilling states, the
OTP will also need to monitor ongoing domestic judicial proceedings to
ensure that any national prosecutions that are initiated meet the standards of
genuineness outlined in the Rome Statute.146 There is reason to be concerned that, where previously unwilling states undertake domestic prosecution in response to the threat of international prosecution by the OTP, the
resultant domestic proceedings may lack a genuine intent to bring senior
level suspects to justice. The current attempts by the Sudanese government
to use domestic courts as an alternative to the ICC provide a clear example of
this potential danger.147 The OTP may seek to minimize this risk by monitoring national proceedings directly or, in order to conserve resources and
maximize impact, by developing partnerships with NGOs and international
organizations to conduct such monitoring.148 By watching domestic proceedings and issuing public statements when necessary, the OTP and its
partners may be able to provide ongoing pressure to ensure that domestic
investigations and prosecutions meet basic standards of due process and represent genuine efforts to bring the accused to justice. Such monitoring may
also be able to draw a state’s attention to inadvertent inadequacies in its
domestic processes at a stage when reform or adjustment is still possible.
Taken collectively, these tactics offer a promising means of catalyzing domestic prosecutions by at least some initially unwilling states.
145. Such an approach draws heavily on liberal theories of international relations. See Andrew Moravcsik, Taking Preferences Seriously: A Liberal Theory of International Politics, 51 INT’L ORG. 513, 518 (1997)
(“Representative institutions . . . constitute the critical ‘transmission belt’ by which the preferences and
social power of individuals and groups are translated into state policy.”).
146. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art 17. For a discussion of standards of genuineness, see BurkeWhite, Complementarity in Practice, supra note 15, at 574–80; Holmes, Complementarity: National Courts
versus the ICC, supra note 11, at 667–69.
147. See infra text accompanying notes 74–77 for a discussion of the present domestic processes in
Sudan.
148. For example, the Organization on Security and Cooperation in Europe (“OSCE”) has taken primary responsibility for monitoring 11bis trials before the State Court of Bosnia & Herzegovina and
transmits reports on the quality of those proceedings to the Prosecutor of the ICTY. See OSCE, Domestic
War Crimes Prosecutions: Providing Expert and Technical Assistance in Prosecuting War Crimes Cases,
http://www.oscebih.org/human_rights/warcrimes.asp?d=1 (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). See also BurkeWhite, Multilevel Global Governance, supra note 15, at ch. 5. Other NGOs also routinely monitor such
national court proceedings. For example, Human Rights Watch, Amnesty International, the Judicial
System Monitoring Program, and the International Center for Transitional Justice have all issued reports
on the quality of proceedings before various national and international courts. See, e.g., JUDICIAL SYSTEM
MONITORING PROGRAM, OVERVIEW OF THE JUSTICE SECTOR: MARCH 2005 (2005), available at http://
www.jsmp.minihub.org/Reports/jsmpreports/Overview%20of%20Justice%20March%202005/Overview
%20of%20Justice%20March%202005(e).pdf; Human Rights Watch, Judging Dujail: The First Trial
Before the Iraqi High Tribunal, 18 HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH NO. 9(E), Nov. 2006, available at http://hrw.
org/reports/2006/iraq1106/iraq1106web.pdf; INTERNATIONAL CENTER FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, CROATIA: SELECTED DEVELOPMENTS IN TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE (2006), http://www.ictj.org/static/Europe/
TJdevelopments.eng.pdf.
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B. The State with Jurisdiction Is Unable to Prosecute International Crimes
A second class of relationships between the ICC and states arises where
the state in question is unable to undertake investigations or prosecutions of
international crimes. Such inability may stem from civil war, the collapse of
domestic institutions, or a lack of resources and expertise. In these circumstances, the mere threat of international prosecution by the OTP is unlikely
to result in national prosecutions because the failure of national institutions
reflects a deeper structural problem.149 Where states are unable to take action, a policy of proactive complementarity suggests that the OTP should
carefully consider the reasons behind that inability and determine whether it
can alter the ability of a state to investigate and prosecute. Such a determination again requires a careful balancing of the OTP’s limited resources with
the likely impact that international assistance will have. In some circumstances, efforts by the OTP to enhance domestic judicial capacity will be
appropriate. In other circumstances, the resources required to enhance the
ability of a national judiciary to prosecute will be far too great to justify ICC
assistance.
Indeed, the OTP, working together with other international actors, may
have a role to play in assisting national courts, particularly where states are
unable to undertake investigations due to the collapse of national judiciaries,
domestic capacity constraints, or the inability to obtain a suspect or key
evidence. Carefully targeted international assistance may help national governments develop the skills and resources to undertake prosecutions on their
own.150 However, such efforts can be both time- and resource-intensive and,
to the degree that they become a focus of the OTP’s activities, may divert
resources from direct investigation and prosecution by the OTP. Careful
balancing of the costs and benefits of domestic capacity-building efforts is
therefore required before the Court undertakes significant efforts to reform
domestic judiciaries.
1. Tactics Available to Enhance the Judicial Capacity of States Unable to
Prosecute
Through a policy of proactive complementarity, the ICC may be able to
facilitate domestic judicial reform efforts that can transform a state previously unable to prosecute international crimes into a state both able and
willing to undertake domestic investigations and prosecutions. This policy
149. For a discussion of such scenarios, see Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice, supra note 15, at
574–80.
150. See Turner, supra note 144, at 1007 (“Networks can be of assistance in helping states establish
effective investigation and prosecution strategies.”). The Justice Rapid Response Network has been created expressly for this purpose. See ANDRAS VAMOS-GOLDMAN ET AL., JUSTICE RAPID RESPONSE FEASIBILITY STUDY (2005), available at http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/Voelkerrecht/
IStGh/IStGH-JRRdownload.pdf (noting the goal of providing “resources and expertise at short notice in
support of genuine efforts to bring to justice perpetrators [sic] mass crimes.”).
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might include the training of officials, the provision of resources, or assistance with investigations. Indeed, even recognizing the Court’s limited
mandate and resources, a number of tactics are available to the OTP to promote more effective exercise of domestic jurisdiction.
First, the OTP may wish to share legal resources, analysis, and information with national governments or judiciaries. Where a national judiciary is
unable to prosecute because it lacks particular legal resources, investigative
information, or analytical tools, the OTP may be able to catalyze domestic
prosecutions by providing access to publicly available information, analysis
of such information, or even case files that the OTP has opened but decided
not to pursue further. Such an approach would be unlikely to detract significant resources from the Court’s ongoing international investigations.
Second, the OTP may wish to develop and disseminate clear standards
and best practices for the domestic prosecution of international crimes. Such
standards and codes of best practices are already being used in other areas of
international law.151 Standards and best practices provided by the OTP or
through the jurisprudence of the Pre-Trial Chamber may offer a non-legally
binding means of encouraging genuine domestic prosecutions by giving national governments guidance around which they can structure their own
activities.
Third, the OTP may seek to externalize the political costs of prosecution
away from national governments to free them of the political pressures that
might previously have prevented them from acting. When a state is unable
to prosecute because of extreme political pressure from domestic groups or
other powerful states, the OTP may be able to reduce the political costs of
domestic action for the state by making clear to domestic and international
audiences that, if national prosecutions do not unfold, international intervention will follow. East Timor offers an example of such cost-externalization. The Special Panels for the Prosecution of Serious Crimes, established
under U.N. auspices by the U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor, absorbed pressure from Indonesia not to undertake prosecutions,
thereby shifting the political costs of prosecution away from the fragile East

151. In Security Council Resolution 1377, the Security Council refers to “best practices” that may
assist states in implementing the resolution. S.C. Res. 1377, ¶ 13, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1377 (Nov. 12,
2001). Subsequently, a Directory of International Best Practices, Codes and Standards for the Implementation of Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001) was promulgated. See Security Council, CounterTerrorism Comm., Directory of International Best Practices, Codes and Standards for the Implementation of
Security Council Resolution 1373 (2001), available at http://www.un.org/sc/ctc/best_prac.html (last visited
Nov. 12, 2007). Such best practices and codes of conduct have been particularly useful in the area of
international environmental law. The U.N. Global Compact, which includes environmental standards,
represents a more formal code of best practices for corporate responsibility. For a list of its principles, see
U.N. Global Compact, About the Global Compact: The Ten Principles, http://www.unglobalcompact.
org/AboutTheGC/TheTenPrinciples/index.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). See also Sean D. Murphy,
Essay in Honor of Oscar Schachter: Taking Multinational Codes of Conduct to the Next Level, 43 COLUM. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 389, 411 (2005).
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Timorese government and onto the United Nations.152 As a result, the East
Timorese government was able, despite Indonesian opposition, to undertake
such prosecutions until the United Nations withdrew its mission and costs
were shifted back to the fragile new state.
Fourth, the OTP may, at times, choose to provide direct technical assistance to states that are unable to prosecute. Such activities present the greatest danger of resource diversion and, thus, must be pursued with the utmost
caution. Where states need specific but limited technical assistance, the
OTP may consider such requests, bearing in mind its resource limitations,
mandate, and the potential legal implications.153 In many cases, in order to
minimize potential admissibility challenges, assistance may be best provided
through general seminars or trainings for national officials, conducted in
The Hague rather than through an on-site mission to the state in question.
Fifth, in scenarios in which the ICC does pursue international prosecution, the OTP may wish to consider domestic judicial reform as part of its
exit strategy from the situation. When the OTP finishes its work in a particular situation, it may seek to make a longer-lasting contribution to domestic
judicial efforts through direct assistance, training, and resource provision
that would allow national officials to pick up where the ICC leaves off. As
noted below, after the conclusion of proceedings before the Court, the risk
that significant involvement with domestic governments will preclude the
admissibility of the case in future ICC proceedings declines sharply. Additionally, national judicial systems may be better positioned to receive assistance once the immediate conflict has passed. Accordingly, judicial reform
efforts will often be optimized if incorporated into the OTP’s exit
strategies.154
While the tactics discussed above provide the OTP with a number of
direct means to enhance the capacity of national governments to prosecute
international crimes, the most effective and cost-efficient means for the ICC
152. For a discussion, see Burke-White, supra note 107, at 41–53.
153. The ICTY has taken this approach and provided a variety of training sessions, usually through
the involvement of ICTY experts in programs organized by third parties. See, e.g., Press Release, ICTY,
President Pocar Participates in Expert Meeting on Inter-State Judicial Cooperation in War Crimes Proceedings (June 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/2007/pr1163e.htm (noting that
exclusively for the media and not an official document); Press Release, ICTY, ICTY Weekly Press Briefing (May 16, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/icty/briefing/2007/pb070516.htm (noting a training
program for Macedonian judges).
154. The ICTY has also been considering the question of domestic judicial capacity and the Tribunal’s long-term impact. See Press Release, ICTY, Address by His Excellency, Judge Claude Jorda, President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, to the United Nations Security
Council, JDH/PIS/690-e (July 26, 2002), available at http://www.un.org/icty/pressreal/p690-e.htm
[hereinafter Jorda July 2002 Address]. The ICTY’s exit strategy from the Balkans, memorialized in its
Completion Strategy, involves explicit efforts to activate domestic judicial institutions in Bosnia. See
generally Johnson, supra note 43; William W. Burke-White, The Domestic Influence of International Criminal
Tribunals: The International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia and the Creation of the State Court of
Bosnia and Herzegovina, 46 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. (forthcoming 2008); Michael Bohlander, Last Exit
Bosnia—Transferring War Crimes Prosecutions from the International Tribunal to Domestic Courts, 14 CRIM. L.F.
59 (2003).
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to improve the functioning of failed domestic judiciaries will be through the
mobilization of external resource networks. The Court’s position on the
global stage and the vast array of NGOs that have developed in relation to
the Court give it a powerful role in networking, resource generation, and
agenda setting, all of which would help to promote domestic judicial reform.155 By mobilizing such external resource networks, the Court may be
able to leverage its own limited resources in an efficient manner to support
broader judicial development by other actors in the international system.
Such a network-based approach recognizes that other institutions and organizations may be more effective and efficient in providing aid to national
judiciaries than the OTP itself. Local and international NGOs, inter-governmental organizations, and third-party states may have more resources,
greater experience, and a superior ability to facilitate and assist with domestic judicial capacity building.156 For example, the recently created Justice
Rapid Response Initiative makes it possible to provide immediate assistance
to states that seek to undertake investigations of international crimes but
lack the domestic resources to do so.157 A number of national governments
have developed special offices within their ministries of justice for the prosecution of international crimes, and these offices regularly provide assistance
to other states.158 Even the United States, traditionally an opponent of the
ICC, might be willing to provide assistance to the national governments
that seek to prosecute international crimes themselves; and it has considerable capacity to do so.159 Indeed, many national governments are likely to
have greater financial resources that can be devoted to domestic judicial reform programs than does the ICC.160
Ultimately, therefore, the most effective role for the ICC to play in the
endeavor of enhancing domestic judicial capacity may be one of mobilizing
155. Such NGOs include, for example, The Coalition for the International Criminal Court, Parliamentarians for Global Action, and the International Center for Transitional Justice.
156. For a discussion of the potential of such networks in the enforcement of international criminal
law, see Turner, supra note 144.
157. For information on the current status on the Justice Rapid Response Initiative from the perspective of one of the states that has shown early interest in and support for it, see German Foreign Office,
Foreign Policy: Justice Rapid Response, http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de/diplo/en/Aussenpolitik/
Voelkerrecht/IStGh/IStGH-JRRSeite.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
158. See, e.g., U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RIGHTS, AND LABOR, 2001
COUNTRY REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES (2002), available at http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/
hrrpt/2001 (discussing, within individual reports, a number of national prosecutors’ offices with such
capacities).
159. For information on the capabilities of the relevant U.S. program, see U.S. Dep’t of Justice, What
is the Office of Overseas Prosecutorial Development, Assistance and Training (OPDAT), http://www.
usdoj.gov/criminal/opdat/mission/mission.html (last visited Nov. 14, 2007).
160. For example, the European Commission has recently approved significant funding for the extension of an initial project for the restoration of the judicial system in eastern D.R. Congo. See European
Union at the United Nations, The European Commission Contributes to the Restoration of Justice in the
East of the Democratic Republic of the Congo, http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_6062_
en.htm (last visited Nov. 14, 2007). Such a program would be far beyond even the most ambitious
program that the ICC could undertake.
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networks of actors. As Jenia Turner has noted, “The ICC is . . . likely to
serve as a catalyst for networks . . . .”161 The OTP is uniquely positioned to
draw attention to the failure of domestic judiciaries and to seek others to
channel resources to them. Likewise, the Court could focus global attention
on particular countries with judicial inadequacies by, for example, convening meetings of NGOs and states with respect to judicial reform activities.
The OTP may wish to maintain a roster of willing experts, consultants, and
NGOs able to assist states that would be made available to national governments seeking assistance. The OTP can draw the attention of such networks
to particular states; broker contacts between states, institutions, and organizations to facilitate domestic judicial reform efforts; and directly request
networks to assist troubled states. Moreover, the OTP can use its connections with national governments, perhaps through the ASP, to stimulate
bilateral aid to states seeking assistance in judicial capacity building. Indeed, the ICC is likely to excel at coordinating the efforts of different
institutions.
This network approach fits closely with the Prosecutor’s existing strategies. As he noted to the diplomatic corps at The Hague on February 12,
2004, the OTP will rely “on extensive networks of support with States, civil
society, multilateral institutions, academics and the private sector. This approach enables [the OTP] to better represent [ninety-two] States Parties and
to benefit from ideas and perspectives from around the world.”162 Mobilizing networks of support may be the best way to realize the benefits of proactive complementarity without broader resource commitment or legal
complications.
2. Grounds for Caution in Undertaking Domestic Judicial Reform
Despite the benefits that would flow from making improvements to
struggling domestic judiciaries, two sets of considerations counsel particular
caution in the ICC’s undertaking of national judicial reform. First, the existing international criminal tribunals have had very limited success in such
efforts. Second, active involvement in national judicial reform or in specific
national cases may have dangerous legal consequences in the form of subsequent admissibility challenges to ICC proceedings.
The experiences of other international courts and tribunals indicate some
of the difficulties that the ICC may face if it chooses to engage directly in
domestic capacity building. Such courts have largely been ineffective as
agents of domestic judicial reform. The ad hoc tribunals for both the former
Yugoslavia and Rwanda have been the subjects of considerable criticism due
to their limited contact with national governments and their marginal influ161. Turner, supra note 144, at 1004.
162. Luis Moreno-Ocampo, Prosecutor of the ICC, Statement to the Diplomatic Corps, The Hague,
Netherlands (Feb. 12, 2004), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/organs/otp/LOM_20040212_En.
pdf.
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ence—at least in their early years—in promoting the effective exercise of
national justice.163 The ICTY’s Completion Strategy, which involves transfer
of some cases to national jurisdictions, as endorsed by the Security Council,164 recognizes the Tribunal’s limited impact on domestic judicial institutions in the region and the need to enhance national capacity in order for the
Tribunal to complete its work.165 The ICTY and the International Criminal
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”) have had neither the legal mandate nor the
resources to undertake broad-based judicial reform. Other programs and institutions—such as aid from states and training programs undertaken by
governments, the Office of the High Representative in Bosnia & Herzegovina, and NGOs—have proven better situated to lead such efforts.
Perhaps more effective than the two ad hoc tribunals at facilitating domestic judicial reform and reconstruction are the more recent generation of hybrid tribunals, which draw on a mix of domestic and international resources
and have operated or are operating in Sierra Leone, East Timor, Kosovo,
Bosnia, and Cambodia.166 The Special Court for Sierra Leone (“Special
Court”), for example, is likely to leave a longer legacy on the country’s domestic judiciary than the Yugoslavian and Rwandan tribunals will leave
upon their respective domestic judiciaries, particularly considering the Special Court’s location in Freetown and its broader utilization of domestic local
staff.167 Yet, even the Special Court does not have a clear mandate for do163. See Alvarez, supra note 43, at 365. In fact, the ICTY has at times had a negative impact by
freezing out national judicial efforts or imposing high barriers on national prosecutions through its
“Rules of the Road” provision. For the Rules of the Road provision of the Rome Agreement, see Office of
the High Representative, Agreed Measures (Feb. 18, 1996), as cited in Mark S. Ellis, Bringing Justice to an
Embattled Region—Creating and Implementing the “Rules of the Road” for Bosnia-Herzegovina, 17 BERKELEY J.
INT’L L. 1, 7 n.49 (1999). Approximately 2300 cases sent to the ICTY were never reviewed and lost in
administrative limbo. See OSCE, WAR CRIMES TRIALS BEFORE THE DOMESTIC COURTS OF BOSNIA AND
HERZEGOVINA, PROGRESS AND OBSTACLES 6 (2005), available at http://www.oscebih.org/documents/
1407-eng.pdf. The result, according to observers, was that “[F]or nearly five years, ‘The Rules of the
Road’ agreement shut down all efforts by Bosnian government authorities to utilize justice to remove war
criminals from powerful post-war positions.” See Paul R. Williams & Patricia Taft, The Role of Justice in
the Former Yugoslavia: Antidote or Placebo for Coercive Appeasement?, 35 CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 219,
253–54 (2003).
164. See Jorda July 2002 Address, supra note 154, at 5; see also Security Council, Statement by the
President of the Security Council, U.N. Doc. S/PRST/2002/21 (July 23, 2002), available at http://
daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/491/47/PDF/N0249147.pdf. The Security Council itself has
frequently called for the transfer of cases in resolutions relating to the two tribunals. See S.C. Res. 1503,
¶ 7, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1503 (Aug. 28, 2003) (reaffirming that the ICTY’s goal should be “concentrating
on the prosecution and trial of the most senior leaders suspected of being most responsible for crimes
within the ICTY’s jurisdiction and transferring cases involving those who may not bear this level of
responsibility to competent national jurisdictions, as appropriate, as well as the strengthening of the
capacity of such jurisdictions”). See also S.C. Res. 1534, ¶¶ 4, 6, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1534 (Mar. 26, 2004)
(requiring a review of the ICTY’s case load and regular reports by its president and prosecutor).
165. See generally Burke-White, supra note 154. It should be noted that under the new Completion
Strategy the ICTY has been far more effective in facilitating domestic judicial reform. See id.
166. For a discussion, see generally Burke-White, supra note 107 (considering the law and politics of
the creation of hybrid tribunals in Cambodia, East Timor, and Rwanda). See also Laura Dickinson, The
Promise of Hybrid Courts, 97 AM. J. INT’L L. 295 (2003).
167. For a discussion, see Richard S. Williamson, Transitional Justice: The UN and the Sierra Leone
Special Court, 2 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 1 (2003).
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mestic judicial reform; nor does it have the resources or experience necessary
to be highly effective in facilitating such efforts.168
Given the ICC’s limited resources—both in absolute terms and in comparison to other tribunals such as the ICTY—there is little reason to think
that the Court will be more effective in promoting domestic judicial reform
in the future than other international tribunals have been in the past. Hence,
in attempting to enhance the capacity of states that have been unable to
prosecute international crimes, the ICC’s best tactic will be to mobilize networks of external actors that have the resources and skills to rebuild and
reform domestic judiciaries.
A second reason for being cautious of direct ICC involvement in domestic
judicial reform efforts is that such efforts may have adverse legal consequences for subsequent admissibility determinations. Regardless of the
means by which a case reaches the Court, the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial
Chamber are called upon, at a number of points during the investigation
and prosecution, to engage in a determination of admissibility. Article 17
requires that, when a situation is investigated under the Prosecutor’s proprio
motu powers, both the Prosecutor and the Pre-Trial Chamber must examine
issues of admissibility.169 When the investigation is initiated based on a
referral from a non-affected state party or from the Security Council, article
18 provides that the Prosecutor must make an initial determination of admissibility. That determination may be challenged by the Pre-Trial Chamber’s own motion, the accused, or a state party that is investigating or has
investigated the case. Once admissibility is challenged, the Pre-Trial Chamber may then make its own admissibility determination. Additionally, article 53 indicates that the Prosecutor must take issues of admissibility into
account when initiating an investigation or suspending an already open investigation with the approval of the Pre-Trial Chamber. All such determinations of admissibility include an evaluation of the complementarity criteria
as provided in article 17 of the Statute; and, within that evaluation, any
assistance provided by the Court could have a direct bearing on whether
national prosecutions are considered genuine.
The problems of legal admissibility would be most troubling in circumstances where the ICC undertakes domestic judicial reform efforts and the
national government then proceeds to undertake prosecution on its own.
Although, ideally, this would yield an active national judiciary that provides
real accountability, in certain circumstances, domestic prosecutions might
168. See Statute of the Special Court for Sierra Leone, available at http://www.sc-sl.org/scsl-statute.
html; see also S.C. Res. 1315, U.N. Doc. S/RES/1315 (Aug. 14, 2000) (authorizing the creation of a
special court for Sierra Leone). The one exception to the limited impact of international criminal tribunals on domestic judicial reform is the recent effect of the ICTY’s Completion Strategy on the establishment of the State Court in Bosnia and Herzegovina. For a discussion, see Burke-White, supra note 154.
169. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17. For a further discussion of admissibility determinations,
see Mohamed El Zeidy, Some Remarks on the Question of the Admissibility of a Case during Arrest Warrant
Proceedings before the International Criminal Court, 19 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 741 (2006).
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still lack genuineness or may intentionally shield a particular accused.170 In
such circumstances, the Prosecutor may seek to exercise jurisdiction and assert admissibility based on the lack of a genuine domestic prosecution. If the
ICC takes up such a case, an admissibility challenge may be filed, pursuant
to article 19 of the Statute, by either the accused, a state with jurisdiction
over the case, or a state from which acceptance of jurisdiction is required.
The entity challenging admissibility of the case may well cite the assistance
from, training by, or involvement of the OTP in domestic proceedings as
evidence of a genuine national process and, thereby, seek to prevent the
admissibility of the case at the ICC.
Article 17 of the Statute provides that a case will be inadmissible where it
“is being investigated or prosecuted by a State which has jurisdiction over
it, unless the State is unwilling or unable genuinely to carry out the investigation or prosecution.”171 In determining the ability of a national government to undertake genuine proceedings, the Prosecutor and Pre-Trial
Chamber are instructed to consider “whether, due to a total or substantial
collapse or unavailability of its national judicial system, the State is unable
to obtain the accused or the necessary evidence and testimony or otherwise
unable to carry out its proceedings.”172 Direct assistance from the ICC could
be decisive in the Pre-Trial Chamber’s determination that, for example, the
national judicial system is now able to prosecute.173 In cases in which admissibility is asserted by the OTP based on an undue delay of national proceedings, it is also conceivable that a state or accused challenging admissibility
could claim that, where the Court has committed to provide assistance, any
delay of process was attributable to the slow pace of cooperation or to difficulties encountered in receiving such assistance from the OTP.
Thus far, the Pre-Trial Chamber has taken an active approach to determining whether cases are admissible, even at the arrest warrant phase of
proceedings.174 In the case of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, for example, Pre-Trial
Chamber I observed, “it is the Chamber’s view that an initial determination
on whether the case against Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo falls within the
jurisdiction of the Court and is admissible is a prerequisite to the issuance of a
warrant of arrest for him.”175 In considering admissibility, the Pre-Trial
170. In these circumstances, the OTP could still seek to assert the admissibility of the case despite a
national proceeding. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(2) (“In order to determine unwillingness in
a particular case, the Court shall consider, having regard to the principles of due process recognized by
international law, whether one or more of the following exist, as applicable: (a) The proceedings were or
are being undertaken or the national decision was made for the purpose of shielding the person concerned
from criminal responsibility for crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court referred to in article 5.”).
171. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(1)(a). For further discussion, see Holmes, The Principle of
Complementarity, supra note 11, at 41–78.
172. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17(3).
173. In egregious cases, the failure of the state to heed the advice of the OTP might, instead, be
viewed as evidence of the state’s continued inability to prosecute international crimes.
174. For a detailed discussion of admissibility requirements and the Pre-Trial Chamber’s role in judging admissibility, see El Zeidy, supra note 169.
175. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo, supra note 106, ¶ 18 (emphasis added).
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Chamber undertook a detailed analysis of the charges against Lubanga before
Congolese courts prior to determining that there had not been a domestic
investigation of the same charges as those included in the Prosecutor’s indictment.176 Elsewhere, in a decision of July 8, 2005, Pre-Trial Chamber II
concluded that the case against Joseph Kony “appear[ed] to be admissible”
only after considering the inability of the Ugandan authorities to apprehend
Kony, who was in the D.R. Congo at the time.177 In both cases, the PreTrial Chamber conducted an extensive analysis of admissibility on its own
accord, suggesting that it will not merely accept the Prosecutor’s assertions
of admissibility. Similarly, other jurisprudence from the Pre-Trial Chamber
suggests that it may seek to challenge prosecutorial submissions on its own
accord.178 Given the strict scrutiny applied by the Pre-Trial Chamber, the
Prosecutor must be cautious when undertaking actions that could preclude
admissibility in the future.
Given the dearth of jurisprudence indicating how the Pre-Trial Chamber
would treat assistance from the OTP, the development of specific strategies
to avoid adverse admissibility findings may be premature. However, certain
types of assistance and training are likely to pose greater risks than others.
Two key factors are likely to influence whether any assistance programs
cause admissibility risks: the specificity of the assistance provided and the
depth of the ICC’s involvement in the domestic case or in national reform
efforts. The more specifically tailored that ICC assistance is to a particular
national case, the greater the likelihood that its assistance could provide
grounds for a future admissibility challenge. At the lowest levels of specificity, general training made available to any national government would be
unlikely to pose a substantial risk, as it would be both available to all states
and of a non-specific nature. Training tailored to the needs of a particular
national government or domestic judicial institution would pose a greater
risk of causing admissibility problems. Finally, assistance and training—or
even direct ICC involvement—in a particular case at the national level
would present the greatest risk to a subsequent admissibility challenge.
Just as the specificity of assistance is likely to be relevant to admissibility
determinations, so too is the depth of the OTP’s involvement in a national
proceeding likely to play a crucial role. The mere provision of information or
176. Id., ¶¶ 30–40.
177. Prosecutor v. Kony, Otti, Lukwiya, Odhiambo, and Ongwen, Case No. ICC-02/04-01/05, Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application for Warrants of Arrest Under Article 58 (July 8, 2005), available at
http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-01-06-129_English.pdf.
178. In publicly available decisions to date, both the Pre-Trial Chamber and the Appeals Chamber
have sought to develop an independent voice and, at times, check the Prosecutor’s freedom of action. For
example, the Pre-Trial Chamber decided, over the Prosecutor’s objections, to allow victims a clear role in
proceedings even before crimes were alleged; and the Appeals Chamber refused the Prosecutor an interlocutory appeal on that question. See Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, supra note 99;
Situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Case No. ICC-01/04, Judgment on the Prosecutor’s
Application for Extraordinary Review of Pre-Trial Chamber 1’s 31 March 2006 Decision Denying Leave
to Appeal (July 13, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/library/cases/ICC-01-04-168_English.pdf.
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evidence to a national judiciary is least likely to impact admissibility. Similarly, the publication of general standards, the compilation of best practices,
the provision of a list of experts, or the mobilization of a network of resources by the OTP is not likely to be problematic. In contrast, field visits
by Court personnel for the purpose of training or direct participation of
Court staff in a national proceeding would pose a far greater risk of adverse
admissibility consequences.
Overall, the OTP will need to balance the potential benefits of providing
assistance to national proceedings with the downstream legal risks that may
result from such a strategy. Again, therefore, the danger of admissibility
consequences flowing from the ICC’s direct involvement in judicial reform
efforts suggests that mobilizing external resources may be the best tactic for
the Court to improve the ability of states unwilling to prosecute.
C. Where a State with Jurisdiction Engages in an Active Division of
Labor with the Court
A third class of relationships between the Court and states is likely to
arise where the ICC and a state cooperate in the prosecution of international
crimes through a division of labor. From a legal perspective, the division of
labor may be a rare occurrence because the ICC is unable to act where national governments act themselves. Nonetheless, a window of opportunity
for a division of labor arises in three circumstances. First, a division of labor
may occur when a state is able and willing to prosecute international crimes
generally but is unable or unwilling to prosecute a particular suspect or case.
Often for political reasons, even a national judicial system that is able to
undertake the prosecution of serious international crimes may be unable to
investigate and prosecute the most senior perpetrators of such crimes or may
be unable to obtain necessary evidence from third-party states with respect
to particular crimes. In such a situation, the particular cases not addressed
domestically would be admissible before the ICC, despite the general willingness of the national government to act. Second, a division of labor may
also arise where the OTP seeks to prosecute those crimes meeting the gravity threshold articulated in article 17 and a state seeks accountability
(whether criminal or non-criminal) for lower-level offenders who are not
likely to be the subjects of an ICC investigation.179 Finally, a division of
labor may occur where a non-territorial state prosecutes particular suspects
179. As noted above, the ICC will only prosecute those that are most responsible for international
crimes and those crimes that meet the gravity threshold of article 17. Rome Statute, supra note 11, art.
17(1)(d) (providing that a case is inadmissible if it is “not of sufficient gravity to justify further action by
the Court”). The Prosecutor has treated this restriction more as a policy choice than a legal requirement
but has nonetheless emphasized that the gravity of the crime will be an important element of case
selection. See ICC, OTP, Criteria for Selection of Situations and Cases (June 2006) (unpublished policy
paper, on file with the author).
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under principles of universal jurisdiction, leaving the ICC to prosecute other
cases.
The Dutch prosecution of Guus Kouwenhoven illustrates a further scenario in which a division of labor can exist between the ICC and national
governments as part of a policy of proactive complementarity, namely where
a third state undertakes a prosecution under universal jurisdiction to complement the work of the ICC. In 2003, shortly after assuming office, the
Prosecutor publicly drew attention to the financial links behind many international crimes and encouraged states to join him in investigating “criminal
business.”180 In response thereto, the Netherlands began an investigation of
Guus Kouwenhoven, a Dutch businessman involved in the arms trade with
Liberia. Subsequently, Kouwenhoven was convicted by Dutch courts and
sentenced to eight years imprisonment based on violations of the U.N. arms
embargo against Liberia.181 According to the spokeswoman for the Netherlands Prosecution Service, the ICC Prosecutor’s comments prompted the
Dutch investigation of nationals involved in grave human rights violations
abroad.182
For a division of labor to be successful, communication between the OTP
and states undertaking domestic justice processes will be needed, and a coordinated approach that maximizes the collective contribution toward ending
impunity must be devised. An active division of labor fits closely with the
strategic objectives of the OTP, as it can help maximize the Court’s effectiveness while efficiently allocating resources. Dividing labor with states
would allow the OTP to focus on prosecuting those most responsible for
crimes within the jurisdiction of the Court and allow it to carefully focus its
resources on maximizing its impact.183 By partnering with national judiciaries, the Court can help minimize or eliminate the impunity gap by ensuring
that even suspects who do not meet the ICC’s gravity threshold are held
accountable domestically.
While active division of labor has the potential to significantly further
the OTP’s goals, it also raises potential conflicts. First, where the OTP and a
state seek to divide labor, there is a danger that the state will free ride on the
Court’s provision of public goods like investigation and prosecution. By allowing the OTP to prosecute certain individuals, a state may benefit from
reduced financial and political costs and avoid its own international legal
180. Marlise Simons, The Dutch Try One of Their Own over Links to Liberia, N.Y. TIMES, May 3, 2006, at
A3.
181. Marlise Simons, 8 Year Sentence for Businessman Who Smuggled Arms to Liberia, N.Y. TIMES, June 8,
2006, at A8. However, Von Kouwenhoven was acquitted of war crimes charges based on insufficient
evidence. Id.; see also Dutch National Faces Eight Year Prison Sentence for Arms Trading in Liberia, INTEGRATED REG’L INFO. NETWORKS, June 7, 2006, http://www.irinnews.org/report.aspx?reportid=59248.
182. Marlise Simons, supra note 180, at A3.
183. See Paper on Some Policy Issues Before the Office of the Prosecutor, supra note 65, at 3 (“The
Office will function with a two-tiered approach to combat impunity. On the one hand it will initiate
prosecutions of the leaders who bear most responsibility for the crimes. On the other hand it will encourage national prosecutions, where possible, for lower ranking perpetrators . . . .”).
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obligations to prosecute. Hence, some governments that are able and willing
to prosecute all crimes within their jurisdiction may seek greater involvement from the OTP than is strictly necessary in order to avoid the burdens
of prosecuting themselves.184 The OTP should be vigilantly mindful of this
possibility, particularly in the case of “self referrals,” where a state refers a
situation in its own territory to the Court.185
Second, active division of labor with a state may result in the appearance
of impropriety or bias. The ICC and Uganda, for example, have essentially
divided labor, with the ICC only prosecuting the four surviving senior leaders of the LRA and the Ugandan government providing accountability or
amnesty for remaining perpetrators.186 Yet, the now infamous “handshake”
at a London hotel in 2004 between Ugandan President Museveni and ICC
Prosecutor Luis Moreno-Ocampo has led many Ugandans to view the Court
as a tool of the government and to question its independence.187 Active division of labor requires cooperation and, often, close contact with a state that
could be viewed as inappropriate for the independence and impartiality of
the OTP. Hence, an active division of labor is best pursued where the state
with which the OTP seeks to cooperate has clean or relatively clean hands.
Even in those cases, the Court must avoid appearing biased.
Third, an active division of labor may result in future admissibility challenges similar to those that might arise when the ICC attempts to directly
enhance the capacity of domestic courts. The cooperation, inherent in any
effective division of labor, between a state and the OTP may subsequently
be cited by the state in an admissibility challenge. In light of this potential
legal implication, the division of labor may be most appropriate for states

184. This situation may seem to conflict with one of the arguments at the heart of proactive complementarity, namely that states will generally prefer to prosecute domestically than allow international
intervention. However, there will be situations in which the perceived sovereignty costs of international
intervention are low and the political or financial costs of domestic action are high. In such circumstances, positive complementarity is unlikely to be successful and the real danger is that national governments will seek to outsource the costs of prosecution to the ICC, resulting in greater ICC involvement
than is necessary or efficient.
185. On the practice of self-referrals, see William A. Schabas, First Prosecutions at the International
Criminal Court, 27 HUM. RTS. L.J. 25, 27–29 (2006); Mohamed M. El Zeidy, The Ugandan Government
Triggers the First Test of the Complementarity Principle: An Assessment of the First State’s Party Referral to the
ICC, 5 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 83, 99–110 (2005); Claus Kress, ‘Self Referrals’ and ‘Waivers of Complementarity’: Some Considerations in Law and Policy, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 944 (2004); Paola Gaeta, Is the Practice of
‘Self-Referrals’ a Sound Start for the ICC?, 2 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 949 (2004).
186. See Agreement on Justice and Reconciliation, Uganda-Lord’s Resistance Army/Movement (LRA/
M), Jun. 29, 2007; see also Moreno-Ocampo, supra note 8, at 8 (“[In] Uganda, the Court has issued arrest
warrants against [four] individuals; but other national mechanisms can be useful for the other combatants
. . . those who do not bear the greatest responsibility.”).
187. For discussions of the perception of bias generated by this meeting, see David Lanz, The ICC’s
Intervention in Northern Uganda: Beyond the Simplicity of Peace vs. Justice 10 (Fletcher School of Law and
Diplomacy Working Paper, May 2007), available at http://fletcher.tufts.edu/humansecurity/pdf/paper_
uganda-ICC_lanz.pdf; see also Zachary Lomo, Why the International Criminal Court Must Withdraw Indictments Against the Top LRA Leaders: A Legal Perspective, SUNDAY MONITOR (Kampala), Aug. 20, 2006,
available at http://www.refugeelawproject.org/resources/papers/others/whyICCmustwithdraw.htm.
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that are likely to undertake genuine prosecutions, thereby rendering potential admissibility concerns moot.
Fourth, the active division of labor may result in conflicts with states
that, in turn, lead to a less-than-efficient allocation of resources. For example, the failure to agree in advance on the gravity threshold that separates
crimes to be prosecuted by the OTP and those to be prosecuted domestically
may create confusion or actually widen the impunity gap if certain suspects
fall through the cracks. Even where such an agreement has been reached
with a state, the state might subsequently alter its policies and assert primacy over the ICC. As the national government would then be prosecuting
the case, the ICC investigation would be barred by article 17.188 OTP resources would have been wasted, but—because the national judiciary would
have been activated—the net result would still be proactive. Careful coordination is necessary for such a strategy to work.
A final form of conflict may arise where a state seeks to provide noncriminal accountability for lower-level offenders. The experience of the Special Court for Sierra Leone demonstrates potential difficulties where truth
commissions and prosecutions operate simultaneously.189 Tensions may arise
with respect to the use of information uncovered by a truth commission in
criminal proceedings, or victims and witnesses may not understand the purposes and powers of various institutions. Again, such problems can be addressed through careful coordination and sequencing. Outreach programs
will need to make the different purposes and powers of various institutions
clear. Timing and sequencing of institutional responses can minimize conflict by, for example, completing some criminal prosecutions before initiating truth commission proceedings.
Despite the potential complications and difficulties inherent in an active
division of labor, sharing the burden of providing accountability for crimes
within the Court’s jurisdiction remains an efficient and effective way to end
impunity more broadly and to meet the high expectations of the Court. To
maximize the potential benefits of a division of labor, the OTP must engage
in two preliminary steps. First, the OTP will have to carefully identify appropriate partner states. Generally, the OTP will only be able to divide labor
with states that have jurisdiction over the crimes in question—most often
the territorial or national states. Beyond jurisdictional considerations, the
OTP should only partner with states that are unlikely to generate subsequent admissibility challenges—ideally states that have clean hands themselves and have independent, effective judiciaries.190 Sometimes, a division of
188. See Rome Statute, supra note 11, art. 17.
189. For a discussion of the interaction of these institutions, see William Schabas, Amnesty, The Sierra
Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission and the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 11 U.C. DAVIS. J. INT’L L. &
POL’Y 145 (2004); William Schabas, The Relationship Between Truth Commissions and International Courts:
The Case of Sierra Leone, 25 HUM. RTS. Q. 1035, 1049–51 (2003).
190. Of course, states with clean hands and independent judiciaries are also those least likely to need
to divide labor with the ICC since they will presumably be able to prosecute all crimes within their

R

\\server05\productn\H\HLI\49-1\HLI101.txt

unknown

2008 / Proactive Complementarity

Seq: 53

28-DEC-07

14:21

105

labor with the territorial state would be unwise, and the OTP will have to
consider whether a division of labor with a non-territorial state might be an
appropriate alternative.191 Second, the ICC will need to determine the best
interlocutors within a state with whom to cooperate in a division of labor.
As noted above, initial contact would presumably occur through formal diplomatic channels. Given the specific and, at times, technical nature of the
cooperation and coordination necessary for an effective division of labor, it
may be necessary to develop additional direct communication with judicial
officials. For instance, coordination with the ministry of justice or prosecutors may result in a more effective division of labor.192
Beyond these two general considerations that arise in the context of a
division of labor, the OTP must be wary of the potential conflicts that may
flow from close cooperation with national governments. Specifically, the
Prosecutor must avoid the free-rider scenario through careful “willingness”
evaluations. The OTP should also maintain an independent and objective
position concerning the states with which it divides labor and remain cognizant of any crimes alleged to have been committed by or with the acquiescence of the state in question. Finally, the OTP will need to carefully
coordinate with the states with which it seeks to divide labor through ongoing dialogue. Where possible, the OTP and the state in question should
reach a nonbinding strategic agreement as to which cases will be prosecuted
at which level.193
V.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps the best example of how a policy of proactive complementarity
might be able to impact a domestic government is the ICC’s current investigation in the D.R. Congo. Though the ICC has not intentionally sought to
activate the Congolese domestic judiciary, that investigation has had the
jurisdictions themselves. Hence, risks will have to be taken involving, on occasion, the division of labor
with less than ideal partners. Such risks, however, must be carefully considered; and the benefits of a
division of labor must be balanced against the potential dangers of partnering with states that may not
ultimately undertake genuine prosecutions.
191. For example, the OTP could divide labor with the national state of the perpetrator or a state
acting under passive personality or universal jurisdiction. For a discussion of the exercise of universal
jurisdiction, see Kenneth C. Randall, Universal Jurisdiction Under International Law, 66 TEX. L. REV. 785
(1988). For the treatment of the contemporary practice of universal jurisdiction, see REYDAMS, supra note
42.
192. Where a state has undertaken a non-judicial form of accountability for lower-level offenders, it
may be appropriate to communicate directly with a truth commission or traditional justice leader so as to
minimize potential conflicts.
193. Such an agreement could, for example, involve the ICC starting its investigations with those
most responsible for international crimes and the state starting with lower-level offenders. Alternatively,
the agreement could use sequencing to allow the ICC to act first and have national prosecutions follow at
a later date. Such a division of labor agreement might also cover the sharing and use of investigative files
and other information between the OTP and national governments. For an overview of the types of
arrangements possible between states and the ICC, see Coalition for the International Criminal Court,
Cooperation with States, http://www.iccnow.org/?mod=agreementsgov (last visited Nov. 15, 2007).
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very catalytic effects that could be expected to flow from a policy of proactive complementarity. Following the Prosecutor’s announcement in September 2003 that he would examine the situation in the D.R. Congo,194 key
Congolese government figures sought to make a case for the assertion of
primacy over the ICC. In late September 2003, a series of senior Congolese
officials appeared on local TV and radio to argue that the D.R. Congo was
competent to try these cases.195 Notable judicial reform efforts were subsequently undertaken, though the Congolese judiciary remains in a general
state of disrepair.196 More recently, and due in part to the strengthening of
the national government, domestic courts in the D.R. Congo have become
considerably more active in investigating and prosecuting international
crimes.197 In the first half of 2006 alone, domestic military courts in the
D.R. Congo convicted one officer of war crimes and another of recruiting
child soldiers.198 Similarly, forty-eight soldiers were convicted in the
Equateur Province for rape and murder as crimes against humanity.199 In
2007, verdicts were delivered by the Kissangani Military Court on a highprofile case in Bunia, and trials continued before the Military Tribunal in
Bukavu.200
Not only does the D.R. Congo situation highlight the potential for the
ICC to prompt domestic governments to take action, it also demonstrates
how the Rome System of Justice in fact empowers domestic governments to
take that action. In each of these cases, Congolese military courts directly
applied the Rome Statute of the ICC as the operative law and basis for
convictions.201 The Haute Cour Militaire recently confirmed that the Rome
194. ICC, OTP, Second Assembly of States Parties to the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
Report of the Prosecutor of the ICC, Mr. Luis Moreno-Ocampo (Sept. 8, 2003), available at http://www.iccnow.
org/documents/LMOstatementASP8Sept03.pdf.
195. Interview by Yuriko Kuga, Leslie Medema & Adrian Alvarez with Joe Wells, International
Human Rights Law Group, in Kinshasa, D.R. Congo (Oct. 27, 2003). For a more detailed discussion, see
Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice, supra note 15, at 570.
196. For an evaluation of the Congolese judiciary, see Burke-White, Complementarity in Practice, supra
note 15, at 576; see also HUMAN RIGHTS WATCH, DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO: CONFRONTING
IMPUNITY (2004), available at http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/02/02/congo7230.htm.
197. The growing ability of the Congolese judiciary to undertake its own investigations has not in
any way compromised the admissibility of cases before the ICC because D.R. Congo has not sought to
prosecute the same individuals named in ICC indictments for the same crimes. The Pre-Trial Chamber
did, however, have to address the Congolese charges against Thomas Lubanga for murder before deeming
the case admissible before the ICC. In that case the Pre-Trial Chamber found that the ICC indictment
with respect to child soldiers was for different crimes than any domestic prosecution would involve and
therefore the admissibility criteria of article 17 of the Rome Statute were met. See Prosecutor v. Dyilo,
supra note 106.
198. U.N. Mission in the Congo [MONUC], Human Rights Div., The Human Rights Situation in the
DRC During the Period of January to June 2006 (July 27, 2006), available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/
texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=publisher&amp;docid=46caaafe0&amp;skip=&amppublisher=
MONUC [hereinafter The Human Rights Situation in the DRC].
199. Id.
200. MONUC, Human Rights Div., Monthly Human Rights Assessment: July 2007 (Sept. 17, 2007),
available at http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=publisher&amp;docid=46ee
75401a&amp;skip=&amp;publisher=MONUC&amp;type=COUNTRYREP.
201. MONUC, The Human Rights Situation in the DRC, supra note 198, at 11.
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Statute could be applied domestically and that judges could rely on “definitions of international crimes according to international law,” rather than the
less precise and less complete definitions in Congolese military law.202 The
situation makes clear that the Court can meaningfully influence domestic
governments. Indeed, without the involvement of the ICC in D.R. Congo, it
is unlikely that Congolese domestic courts would have initiated proceedings
or that there would have even been a basis for such prosecutions in the
country’s domestic law.203
A policy of proactive complementarity would transform the fortunate, but
unintended, consequences of ICC investigations like the one in D.R. Congo
into a strategic policy of the Court. That policy would be predicated upon
the Court’s actively attempting to catalyze domestic jurisdictions so as to
maximize the collective impact of the ICC and national judiciaries. In so
doing, it would fully activate the Rome System of Justice, provide more
efficient prosecution of international crimes, and help the ICC meet extremely high expectations.
The International Criminal Court’s core mission is to end impunity for
the most serious international crimes. Alone, the OTP can make a contribution to this process by investigating and prosecuting those most responsible
for international crimes. However, the resources and reach of the ICC are
seriously limited; and, acting alone, the Court cannot end impunity, much
less meet the unrealistic hopes that have been placed on the new institution.
The Court is already coming under criticism for having only two suspects in
detention after more than five years of operation. Only if states meet their
international legal obligations to prosecute international crimes can widespread accountability become possible. Proactive complementarity provides
a policy framework for catalyzing and coordinating national prosecution efforts so that the overarching goal of the Rome System of Justice can be
achieved as effectively and efficiently as possible.
The Rome System of Justice envisions clear interactions between the ICC
and national governments in the collective quest of ending impunity.
Within that system, the ICC is uniquely and strategically positioned to
prompt national judicial action. A policy of proactive complementarity
would allow the Court to take advantage of that unique position to maximize the contribution of domestic judiciaries toward ending impunity and
202. Id. In fact, the decision even allows for the application of the ICC Rules of Procedure and
Evidence and sentencing guidelines in domestic military courts.
203. Prior to the Rome Statute, Congolese domestic law provided only the most limited bases for
prosecution of international crimes. See FEDERICO BORELLO, INT’L CTR. FOR TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE, A
FIRST FEW STEPS: THE LONG ROAD TO A JUST PEACE IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO
39–40 (2004), available at http://www.ictj.net/downloads/ICTJ.DRC.Eng.pdf. As Flavia Lattanzi notes
in a commentary on the Statute, “The lack of implementation in domestic legal orders of applicable
international standards . . . could lead to the Court’s decision of the admissibility of a case, as a consequence of the ‘incapability’ of national jurisdictions to provide justice in the case.” Flavia Lattanzi, The
International Criminal Court and National Jurisdictions, in THE ROME STATUTE OF THE INTERNATIONAL
CRIMINAL COURT: A CHALLENGE TO IMPUNITY 181 (Mauro Politi & Giuseppe Nesi eds., 2001).
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would also allow the OTP to focus the majority of its resources on those
situations in which national governments are truly unable or unwilling to
prosecute. Such a policy is a key to the Court’s ultimate success. Though the
Court is likely, over the long term, to be primarily judged on the success of
its own investigations and prosecutions, it is also likely to be blamed for its
own inaction and the ability of a number of serious international criminals
to evade accountability. Pursuing a policy of proactive complementarity can
help the Office of the Prosecutor close the impunity gap and make the
greatest contribution toward the success of the Rome System.
Proactive complementarity critically affirms that neither the ICC nor
states parties to the Rome Statue can view themselves in isolation; they are
part of the Rome System of Justice. That interdependent system relies on
the collective engagement of each of the system’s constituent entities. A
policy of proactive complementarity would provide a powerful mechanism
to link the national and international elements of that system and would
offer the greatest, and perhaps only, prospect of meeting expectations.
Within this system, both states and the ICC must be held jointly accountable for their failure or success at helping to end impunity.
While there are certain risks inherent in a strategy of proactive complementarity, careful implementation can help avoid, manage, or minimize
them. Overall, the most promising prospect for achieving an end to impunity is a combined set of policies using the influence and suasion that comes
with the threat of international prosecution; providing advice and assistance
to national judiciaries in limited circumstances; dividing labor with states;
and helping mobilize networks of states, NGOs, and international organizations to facilitate judicial efficacy. As the 2009 Review Conference approaches, the OTP needs to take serious steps to achieve better congruence
between expectations, mandate, and resources and to avoid perceptions of
failure. The strategic implementation of a policy of proactive complementarity would go far toward achieving that end.

